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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON HEDGE FUND FEE STRUCTURE,
RETURN SMOOTHING AND GROSS PERFORMANCE
SEPTEMBER 2011
SHUANG FENG
B.Econ., PEKING UNIVERSITY
M.Soc.Sci., NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Mila Getmansky Sherman
Hedge funds feature special compensation structure compared to traditional in-
vestments. Previous studies mainly focus on the provisions and incentive structure
of hedge fund contract, such as 2/20, hurdle rates, and high-water mark. The first
essay develops an algorithm to empirically estimate the monthly fees, fund flows and
gross asset values of individual hedge funds. We find that management fee is a ma-
jor component in the dollar amount of hedge fund total fees, and fund flow is more
important in determining the change in fund size compared to net returns, especially
when fund is shrinking in size. We also find that best paid hedge funds concentrate in
the largest hedge fund quintile. Large funds tend to perform better, earn more, and
rely less on management fee for their managers’ compensation. Further, we find that
fund flow is an important determinant of hedge fund managerial incentives. Together
vi
with the “visible” hands of hedge fund management, i.e. the provisions of hedge fund
incentive contracts, the “invisible” hands – fund flows enable investors to effectively
impact hedge fund managerial compensation and incentives.
The second essay studies the relation between return smoothing and manage-
rial incentives of hedge funds. We use gross returns to estimate both unconditional
and conditional return smoothing models. While unconditional return smoothing is
a proxy of illiquidity, conditional return smoothing is related to intentional return
smoothing and may be used as a first screen for hedge fund fraud. We find that
return smoothing is significantly underestimated using net returns, especially for the
graveyard funds. We also find that managerial incentives are positively associated
with both types of return smoothing. While managers of more illiquid funds tend to
earn more incentive fees, funds featuring conditional return smoothing underperform
other funds and do not earn more incentive fees on average. Finally, we find that
failed hedge funds feature more illiquidity and conditional return smoothing.
The third essay explores the difference between the gross-of-fee and net-of-fee
hedge fund performance, by investigating the difference in distribution, factor expo-
sures and alphas between gross returns and net returns. We find that gross returns
are distributed significantly differently from net returns. The gross-of-fee alphas are
higher than the net-of-fee alphas by about 4% per year on average. We also find
positive relation between hedge fund performance and fund size, fund flows, and
managerial incentives, which holds for both gross-of-fee performance and net-of-fee
performance. Our findings suggest that it is necessary to examine the gross-of-fee per-
formance of hedge funds separately from the net-of-fee performance, which may give
us a clearer picture of the risk structure and performance of hedge fund portfolios.
vii
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CHAPTER 1
FLOWS: THE “INVISIBLE HANDS” ON HEDGE FUND
MANAGEMENT
1.1 Introduction
An important question of delegated portfolio management is whether investors
are active and effective in providing ongoing economic incentives to portfolio man-
agers. In mutual funds, performance fees are not common, and economic incentives
depend implicitly on fund flows. But recent literature does not provide strong evi-
dence that investors use fund flows effectively.1 In particular, Sirri and Tufano (1998)
find that mutual fund consumers chase returns, flocking to funds with the highest
recent returns, though failing to flee from poor performers. Fund flows provide signif-
icant rewards for overperformance but do not sufficiently punish underperformance
induces a convexity in the compensation schedule that impacts the manager’s risk-
taking incentive, but not necessarily in the best interest of the investor. Depending on
past performance, it results in too much or too little risk-taking and does not result
in return persistence.2 It suggests that rents are captured by mutual fund managers
while still exposing investors to moral hazard.3 To assume that portfolio managers
should act in the best interest of investors without incentives that align their interests
with those of investors would be a significant act of faith, inconsistent with the vast
1See Brown et al. (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), and Sirri and Tufano (1998).
2See Carpenter (2000) and Basak et al. (2007).
3See Berk and Green (2004).
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literature on moral hazard.4 The empirical evidence is largely consistent with the
observation that economic benefits to investors, if any, are meagre.5
Perhaps individual investors are not best suited to monitor fund managers, and it
may not be surprising that their effectiveness in setting incentives is limited. However,
hedge fund investors are both large and sophisticated. Do they actively incentivize
hedge fund managers, and if so, are these incentives effective? In a recent paper,
Agarwal et al. (2009b) provide some of the first evidence. They document that
hedge funds with greater managerial incentives, proxied by the “delta” of the option-
like incentive contracts, higher level of managerial ownership, and the inclusion of
high-water mark provisions in the incentive contracts, are associated with superior
performance. We argue that a more complete picture is that besides the “visible
hands” on hedge fund management, i.e. the compensation (incentive) contracts, fund
flows also play an important role as the “invisible hands” on hedge fund management,
as hedge fund managers eventually get the benefits of these contracts through fund
flows.
Fees to agents like hedge funds fulfil two objectives. First, fees are designed to
ensure participation by being higher than the reservation wage of the agent. Second,
they provide incentives to the agent. Given the asymmetry of information and moral
hazard, the incentives of the agent must be synchronized with those of the principal.
Investors in hedge funds are generally charged an annual management fee that
can range anywhere from 1% to 3% of assets under management, and also an incen-
tive fee which is typically between 15% and 25% of annual profits, based upon the
funds overall performance.6 How does such standard incentive contract of “2/20”
4See Holmstrom (1979).
5See Elton et al. (2008).
6The fee structure with such rates of management fee and incentive fee is often referred to as
“2/20” or “2 and 20”.
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in the hedge fund industry achieve these objectives optimally from the viewpoint of
investors? With such a high rate of incentive fees, the pay-performance sensitivity of
the hedge fund manager is higher than that of any other industry. It appears that the
hedge fund contract effectively induces participation as well as provides an extremely
generous pay performance sensitivity.
Assuming that the contract achieves participation, then the question arises of
whether the contract is optimal from the viewpoint of investors. How do investors
prevent excessive risk taking by managers? How do investors ensure that the com-
pensation above the participation limit is not excessive? Previous literature mainly
explore these questions from the “2/20” fee structure, high-water mark and other
provisions of hedge fund contract such as lock-up, redemption period, and payout
period. However, these explicit contract may not fully explain hedge fund compensa-
tion as the compensation also depends implicitly on the relation between fund flows
and returns. How important are the explicit contract features (such as the fee rates
and provisions) versus the implicit contract (i.e. the fund flows)?
The above questions were rarely discussed in literature due to the fact that net
returns and net asset values are often used. Gross returns and the dollar amount
of fees are rarely used due to the complexity of calculations and availability of data.
With a comprehensive algorithm of gross returns and fee calculations, we are able to
empirically estimate the monthly fees, fund flows, gross returns of individual hedge
funds and the manager’s option delta as defined by Agarwal et al. (2009b). Using
Goetzmann et al. (2003) as a framework, we explore the proportion of fees in total
asset values and the relative proportions of management fees and incentive fees in the
total compensation. We will also examine the determinants of the change in hedge
fund compensation, and how the fee structure and dollar compensations of hedge
funds are related to the managerial incentives.
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We find that on average management fee is a major component in hedge fund total
compensation, and fund flow is more important in determining the change in fund
size compared to net returns, especially when fund is shrinking in size. Our findings
provide evidence that investors use fund flows to effectively limit both excessive risk
taking and compensation, and that higher managerial incentives are associated with
both better performance and better compensation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 gives a review of
related literature. Section 1.3 describes the data and definition of variables used in
our analysis. Section 1.4 presents the empirical analysis of fund characteristics, fees,
fund flows and managerial incentives. Section 1.5 concludes the paper. The algorithm
of gross returns, fees, and capital flows is given in the Appendix.
1.2 Related Literature
The incentive contract of hedge funds often feature an annual management fee at
about 2% of assets, and a performance (incentive) fee at about 20% of the profits.
It is also very common for hedge fund to have high-water mark and hurdle rate
provisions in their fee contract. The high-water mark for each investor is the maximum
share value of his or her investment in the fund. High-water mark contracts have
the appealing feature that each investor only pays performance fees when the value
of their investment is greater than its previous highest value, which ensures that
an investor only pays an incentive fee for positive performance once any previous
underperformance has been recouped. The existence of such incentive fees and high-
watermark contracts means that hedge fund fees are both time-varying and path-
dependent, and therefore that the relationship between gross and net of fee returns
is nonlinear.
Hedge fund incentive fees can be considered a series of call options on the value
of investor’s investment, where the exercise price is based on the hurdle rate and the
4
investor specific high-water mark. The option on the incentive fee is free since the
manager does not have to pay for it. We can use Black-Scholes option pricing model
to measure the value of the call option on incentive fees. Goetzmann et al. (2003)
point out that the incentive fee contract in hedge funds provides the manager with
a call option and theoretically model the value of this option. When a hedge fund
receives capital flows at different points in time, the incentive fee contract resembles
a portfolio of call options, where each option is related to the capital inflow at a
given point in time and has its own strike price (dictated by the NAV at the time
of entry and whether the fund has hurdle rate and high-water mark provisions). As
Panageas and Westerfield (2009) point out, a hedge fund manager with a high-water
mark provision sees a trade-off between current and future payoffs. A risky portfolio
today, while increasing the probability of ending up above the high-water mark, also
increases the probability that the fund falls significantly below the high-water mark.
They show that with infinite horizon of high-water mark contracts, even risk-neutral
managers would not place an unboundedly large weight on the risky asset, despite the
option features of the contract. Following the insights of Goetzmann et al. (2003),
Agarwal et al. (2009b) empirically estimate the moneyness and delta of this portfolio
of call options. They find that the deltas of the portfolio of incentive contracts are
better measures of managerial incentives relative to incentive fee rates.
Managerial incentives have been associated with hedge fund performance in some
recent studies. Agarwal et al. (2009b) find that hedge funds with greater managerial
incentives, proxied by the delta of the option-like incentive fee contracts, higher lev-
els of managerial ownership, and the inclusion of high-water mark provisions in the
incentive contracts, are associated with superior performance.
The relation between fund flow and performance for both mutual funds and hedge
funds has been discussed in literature, mostly focusing on the influence of past hedge
fund performance on fund flows. Gruber (1996) finds that the flow of new money into
5
the best performing funds is much larger than the flow of money out of the poorer
performing funds. Hu et al. (2009) discusses fund flows in a mutual fund setting and
the relationship to risk. Hendricks et al. (1993) state that, directly or indirectly, in-
vestors in mutual funds are willing to act on such information of relative performance.
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) also discuss the relationship between the inflow of assets
and returns in a mutual fund setting, and Ippolito (1992) finds that mutual fund
investors allocate money to funds with recent good performance. Karceski (2002) ar-
gues that mutual fund investors chase the best performing funds. Lynch and Musto
(2003) discuss the asymmetric relationship between past performance and mutual
fund flows, and Sirri and Tufano (1998) state that prior performance influences the
flow of assets into mutual funds. Wang and Zheng (2008) indicate that hedge fund
investors as a group chase past aggregate performance. Baquero and Verbeek (2009)
find that money inflows are sensitive to past long-run performance and Adams (2007)
examines if manager performance is driving the growth of hedge funds.
Gross returns and the dollar amount of fees are rarely explored in literature due
to the complexity of calculations and lack of information. Only a few recent studies
use estimated gross returns in their analysis, including Brooks et al. (2007), French
(2008) and Agarwal et al. (2009b). Brooks et al. (2007) use estimated gross returns,
instead of net returns in factor models, and show that the use of net of fee returns
can lead to considerably biased estimates of factor exposures which can distort the
picture of fund manager performance. However, their algorithm is based on single-
investor assumption and fund flows are not included in their algorithm of gross return
estimation. Among these papers that estimate gross returns, Agarwal et al. (2009b)
provide the most comprehensive algorithm in the estimation of gross returns. They
introduce an annual algorithm of incentive fees, gross returns and managerial incentive
measures, which takes into account capital flows, high-water mark and hurdle rate
provisions of individual investors. We will extend their algorithm by allowing monthly
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estimation, accrual of incentive fees before they are paid at the end of year, and
modeling both management fee and incentive fee.
1.3 Data and Variable Definition
1.3.1 Data
We use the hedge fund data from Lipper TASS database. TASS has monthly
net-of-fee returns, assets under management, and other fund characteristics, such as
hurdle rates and high-water mark provisions, lockup, notice, and redemption periods,
incentive fees, management fees, inception dates, and fund strategies. TASS also
classifies hedge funds into 12 strategies: Convertible Arbitrage, Dedicated Short Bias,
Emerging Markets, Equity Market Neutral, Event Driven, Fixed Income Arbitrage,
Global Macro, Long/Short Equity Hedge, Managed Futures, Multi-Strategy, Fund
of Funds, and Options Strategy. TASS reports two separate databases, one with
“live” funds and another with “graveyard” funds, which keeps track of funds that
stop reporting and starts in 1994. Our sample period extends from January 1994 to
April 2010. We include both live and graveyard databases and focus on the post-1994
period to mitigate the potential survival-ship bias. As of April 2010, there are 14,177
hedge funds, out of which 5,989 are live, while 8,188 became graveyard during our
sample period.
We exclude funds that i) report gross returns, ii) have missing information on
management fee or incentive fee,7 iii) do not report continuously and monthly, and
iv) are in the categories of funds of funds, or Multi-Strategy, or managed futures, or
7If both rates are reported zero, then the fund is also eliminated from the sample.
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option strategy, or “other” hedge funds, or have missing strategy information.8 We
delete observations that are backfilled to eliminate backfill bias.9
There are additional steps we take to obtain a continuous track of the assets
under management (thereafter, AUM ) and net asset values (thereafter, NAV ) for
the algorithm of gross returns and managerial incentives. We delete observations
with missing or stale AUM at the beginning or the end of the fund performance
history.10We also interpolate the missing or stale AUM for up to 3 months, and then
keep the longest continuous interval of each fund. We winsorize fund flows at top and
bottom 1%.11
After these data cleaning steps, we have 4,952 funds in our sample, out of which
3,116 are live funds and 1,836 are graveyard funds.
Assets Under Management (“EstimatedAssets” in TASS) and NAV are converted
to US dollars if the original currency is not US dollar. The monthly exchange rates
and the three-month LIBOR (the London Interbank Offered Rate) of US dollar are
downloaded from Bloomberg.12
1.3.2 Variable Definition
The variables used in our analysis, especially in the algorithm of gross returns,
fees and capital flows are defined as follows.
8We exclude funds of funds since it has different fee structure from other fund strategies, see
Brown et al. (2004). We exclude managed futures and “other” hedge funds since these categories
are not usually considered “typical” hedge funds. Option strategy is newly added to the database
and has only a few funds.
9The observation is defined as backfilled if the performance date is before “DateAddedToTass”
10Asset Under Management is defined as missing if it is not reported or reported as zero; it is
defined as stale if it is equal to its value of previous month.
11As a robustness check, the unreported results show that winsorzing fund flows at 1% do not
change our main findings.
12LIBOR is used as the hurdle rate in the calculation of fees and gross returns.
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1. AUMt, Asset Under Management, is the total value of investments managed by
the fund, which is equal to NAV multiplied by the total number of shares.
2. NAVt is the per share Net Asset Value after the deduction of all fees and
expenses.
3. GAVt, Gross Asset Value, is the end-of-month asset value per share before the
deduction of all fees and expenses.
4. HWMi,t is the high-water mark for investor i in period t.
5. hurdle is an indicator variable for the hurdle rate provision, which equals 1 if
the fund has a hurdle rate provision, and 0 otherwise.
6. Ht is (1 + hurdle rate). Hedge funds with hurdle rate provision do not charge
a performance fee until its performance exceeds this benchmark rate.
7. NetReturnt is the monthly growth rate of the NAV in period t.
8. GrossReturnt is the monthly rate of return on GAV.
9. Adj GrossReturnt, adjusted gross return, is the monthly rate of return on
the fund value after deducting management fee, but before the deduction of
incentive fees.
10. MF% is the percentage rate of management fee.
11. IF% is the percentage rate of incentive fee.
12. MFt is the per share dollar management fee in period t, calculated as the
product of MF% and NAVt−1.
13. AIFt is the per share accrued incentive fee in period t. The accrued fees earn
returns for investors before being deducted from the fund at the end of each
year.
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14. IFt is the per share monthly incentive fee in period t, which is the difference
between current and previous accrued incentive fees. As the accrued value
depends on the high-water mark and the fund’s performance history, IFt may
be negative if the fund has a negative growth in that month.
15. NSharest is the total number of shares held by all investors in the fund in
period t. NSharesi,t is the number of shares held by investor i in period t.
1.4 Empirical Analysis
1.4.1 Hedge Fund Characteristics
Table 1.1 reports the descriptive statistics of fund characteristics variables for all
funds and each fund strategy from January 1994 to April 2010.
The mean (median) age of funds in our sample is 5.7 (4.8) years . The size (i.e.
AUM) of funds in our sample has a mean of $118.1 million and a median of $33.0
million.
The rate of management fee is on average 1.4%, with a median of 1.5%, while the
incentive fee has a mean of 18.5% and a median of 20%. So more precisely, a common
fee structure of hedge funds is about “1.5/20” for our sample.
69.9% of the hedge funds in the sample have a high-water mark provision for
incentive contract. The mean and median lockup periods are both about 1 year,
and the maximum lockup period is 15 years.13. The mean and median of redemption
period are 0.3 years and 0.2 years, respectively. The percentage of funds using leverage
in the sample is 63.1%, and the mean and median average leverage are 165.8 and 125.0,
respectively, based on funds with non-zero leverage.
13For robustness check, unreported results show that our main findings do not change if we exclude
funds with lockup period of longer than two years.
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The cross-sectional statistical analysis for the different strategies are reported in
Panel B of Table 1.1. The results are consistent with those of all funds with some
variation across different strategies. Long/Short Equity Hedge is the largest category
in our sample, with about half of the funds in the sample. Convertible arbitrage is
the highest in both age and fund size. As to leverage, Dedicated Short Bias, Fixed
Income Arbitrage and Global Macro are highest in the proportion of leveraged funds,
as well as in average leverage. Other fund characteristics have less variation across
fund strategies.
1.4.2 Hedge Fund Performance: Net Return vs Gross Return
We extend the algorithm of Agarwal et al. (2009b) to empirically estimate gross
returns, fees, fund flows, and manager’s delta, using NAV , AUM and other fund
variables. Compared to the algorithm used in Agarwal et al. (2009b), our algorithm
allows the accrual of incentive fees, monthly estimation, and inclusion of management
fees. Our estimation is consistent with the fact that most hedge funds charge their
management fee monthly, and the incentive fees are paid annually and are accrued
before paid out. Computing gross returns monthly allows us to have a larger and
more accurate gross return sample, and makes the frequency of estimation match
that of the reported hedge fund performance data. Estimation of management fees
enables the exploration of the importance of fund flows and management fees. The
details of our algorithm are given in the Appendix.
Table 1.2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of three performance measures:
gross return (GrossReturn), adjusted gross return (Adj GrossReturn) and net re-
turn (NetReturn), for all funds and each fund strategy from January 1994 through
April 2010.
We calculate both equally-weighted (thereafter, “EW”) and value-weighted (there-
after, “VW”) annualized mean return for all three performance measures. The
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equally-weighted mean of gross returns is 6.21% annually, which is higher than that
of the adjusted gross returns by 1.42% and higher than that of the net returns by
3.80%. The value-weighted mean of gross returns is 15.03% annually, which is higher
than that of the adjusted gross returns by 1.38% and higher than that of the net
returns by 4.45%. The median annual gross return is 7.00%, which is higher than
the median annual adjusted gross return by 1.42% and higher than the median an-
nual net returns by 2.79%. The mean and median of returns vary across different
fund strategies. For six out of eight strategies, the value-weighted mean returns are
higher than the equally-weighted mean returns, implying that large funds earn higher
returns compared to small funds.
All three return measures have negative skewness and positive kurtosis. The
first order autocorrelation coefficient are 0.12 for all three return measures. The
rejection rate of Jarque-Bera test of normality is 43.44% for gross returns, and 44.59%
for net returns, implying a large portion of hedge funds feature non-normal return
distribution. We also find that strategies with less liquidity, as indicated by a higher
ρ1, such as Convertible Arbitrage, Emerging Market, Event Driven, and Fixed Income
Arbitrage, feature higher returns. This is associated with liquidity premium which
they may earn by taking more liquidity risk.
The annualized Sharpe ratio of gross return is 0.87, which is higher than that of
the adjusted gross return by 0.17, and lower than that of the net return by 0.23. The
adjusted gross return has the same volatility as the gross return, but its mean is lower,
as only management fee is deducted when calculating the adjusted gross returns. As
a result, the adjusted gross returns have a lower Sharpe ratio than the gross returns.
Net return is lower than adjusted gross return in both mean and volatility, so the
result implies that the magnitude of mean dominates that of the volatility.
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The results show that gross returns and net returns are different in their distribu-
tions. Therefore, the features of their difference, i.e. the fee structure of hedge funds,
should be explored.
1.4.3 Hedge Fund Fees and Fund Flows
Using our algorithm, we calculate the monthly dollar amount of net flows, man-
agement fees, and incentive fees for each fund in our sample. Table 1.3 and Table 1.5
reports the descriptive statistics of fees and fund flows for all funds and for each fund
strategy from January 1994 through April 2010.
In Table 1.3, statistics for both ratios and dollar amounts of hedge fund fees are
reported. First, we calculate the ratio of fees relative to the fund size. On average, the
total fee is 3.36% of gross asset value, with 1.38% of gross asset value as management
fee, and 1.97% of the gross asset value as incentive fee. The value-weighted mean
of management fee to gross asset value ratio is close to its equally weighted mean.
However, the value-weighted mean of incentive fee to gross asset value ratio is 2.33%,
which exceeds the corresponding equally-weighted mean by 0.36%. It implies that
larger funds earn more incentive fees relative to their sizes, as they are more profitable.
As reported in Table 1.3, the average annual management fee are $1.88 million
(EW) and $10.59 million (VW) per fund respectively, while its median is $ 1.84
million. The average annual incentive fee per fund are $2.81 million (EW) and $19.56
million (VW) respectively, while its median is $2.41 million. The average annual total
fee per fund are $4.69 million (EW) and $ 30.15 million (VW) respectively, while its
median is $4.28 million. These results imply that large funds tend to earn more dollar
fees, especially incentive fees.
In Table 1.5, we report the statistics of both the annual fund flows scaled by the
previous-year-end fund size (Flow%), and the dollar amount of annual fund flows.
The average annual capital flow per fund is $1.82 million (EW) and -$45.37 million
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(VW), respectively, while its median is $2.10 million. The difference between the
value-weighted and equally-weighted measures implies that large funds tend to have
more outflows than smaller funds, which is consistent with what we find when we
investigate the observations of fund inflows and fund outflows separately in Panel B
and C of Table 1.5. When including only fund inflows, the dollar amount of fund
inflow has an equally-weighted mean of $51.69 million, and a value-weighted mean
of $177.94 million, while the median fund flow per fund per year is $48.56 million.
When including only fund outflows, the dollar amount of fund outflow has an equally-
weighted mean of -$48.20 million, and a value-weighted mean of -$218.36 million,
while the median fund flow per fund per year is -$45.83 million. These results show
that large funds experience larger amount of fund flows, especially when a fund is
having outflows, compared to funds with smaller sizes.
As shown in Table 1.5, the relative size of annual fund flows (scaled by fund size)
has an equally-weighted mean of 38.53%, and a value-weighted mean of only 5.61%,
while its median is 25.10%. These results imply that on average, annual fund flows
amount to about 39% of their previous-end-of-year asset under management. This
percentage is lower for large funds, implying that the relative size of fund flows is
smaller for the large funds.14
We also find interesting results after breaking the sample by the signs (directions)
of fund flows. When funds have inflows, the relative fund flows has an equally-
weighted mean of 109.24% and a value-weighted mean of 43.96%, and its median is
99.30%. These statistics imply that the average annual fund inflows tend to be about
or even above the fund size, especially for small funds. However, when funds have
outflows, the mean and median of the relative fund flows are -29.88% and -27.73%
respectively, and the median is -29.23%. These results show that the relative size of
14See Fig 1.1 for a plot of the time series of average AUM.
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fund outflows is much smaller than the relative size of fund inflows, and this holds
for both large and small funds.
In summary, Table 1.5 imply that the relative size of annual fund flow is smaller
for large funds, even though the absolute magnitude is bigger for these funds. The
relative sizes of fund inflows and outflows are not symmetric. On average, hedge
funds have experienced much more fund inflows than fund outflows. The relative size
of annual fund inflow tend to be 100% of the previous-period fund size on average,
while the average relative size of fund outflow is only about 30% of the previous fund
size.
1.4.4 The Importance of Management Fees
Investors in hedge funds are generally charged an annual management fee that can
range anywhere from 1% to 3% of assets under management, and also an incentive
fee which is typically between 15% and 25% of annual profits, based upon the funds
overall performance. However, after calculating the dollar amount of both fees, we
find that management fee plays a much more important role in the hedge fund fee
structure than as suggested by its percentage rate.
First, we find that management fees take a larger proportion in total compensation
of hedge fund managers than incentive fees. As reported in Table 1.3, the equally-
weighted (value-weighted) mean of the proportion of annual management fee in the
dollar amount of annual total fee is 62.02% (54.52%). The median of the proportion
of annual management fee in the dollar amount of annual total fee is 60.91%.
Also shown in Table 1.3, The management fee proportion in total fee is greater
than 50% for all fund strategies, which holds for both mean and median. The pro-
portion of management fee in the total fee varies across different fund styles. The
mean ratios of management fee to the dollar amount of total fees range mostly from
50% to 70% for various hedge fund styles, while the median ratio of management fee
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to the dollar amount of total fees range from 55% to 75%. We also find that more
liquid strategies, such as Dedicated Short Bias, Equity Market Neutral, and Global
Macro, have higher proportion of management fee in total fee. This may be explained
by more frequent trading of assets in these liquid strategies, which may boost up the
trading costs and management fees.
The importance of management fee in total compensation is robust over time and
for different fund ages. Panel A of Table 1.4 shows that this ratio increases sharply
during the 1998 LTCM crisis, the 2002 internet bubble crisis, and the 2008 global
financial crisis. The higher proportion of management fee in total fee during the
crisis periods indicates that management fee is the major source of compensation for
hedge funds when the profits and incentive fees are lower during the crisis periods.
Panel B of Table 1.4 shows that the median proportion of management fee in the
dollar total fee is around 50% for most fund ages.
The importance of management fee in total fees is also shown through the ratios
of change in management fee to change in total fees. As reported in Table 1.3, the
change in management fee amounts to 20% to 55% for all fund strategies except
Dedicated Short Bias. However, this ratio is not constant over time and across fund
ages.
In summary, our results imply that management fee takes a major proportion in
the total compensation of hedge funds, especially during crisis periods and for liquid
strategies, and its marginal contribution to the change in the total compensation is
also significant.
1.4.5 Importance of Fund Flow vs. Return in Determining the Change
in Fund Size
Management fee is charged as a percentage of asset under management. To further
investigate the driving factors of management fees, we decompose the change in fund
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size into two components. The change in assets under management, i.e. the fund size,
may occur in two ways. First, it may be resulted from net fund flows. Net inflows
increase the fund size, while outflows reduces the fund size. Second, the change in fund
size can also be attributed to the return on the existing assets under management.
Mathematically, we could decompose the change in fund size as follows.
AUMt − AUMt−1
= [NAVt ×NSharest + AIFt ×NSharest−1 +MVmgrt−1(1 +GrossReturnt)]
−[NAVt−1 ×NSharest−1 + AIFt−1 ×NSharest−2 +MVmgrt−2
×(1 +GrossReturnt−1)]
=
[
NAVt
(
NSharest−1 +
Flowt
NAVt
)
−NAVt−1 ·NSharest−1
]
+ (AIFt ×NSharest−1 − AIFt−1 ×NSharest−2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+ (MVmgrt−1(1 +GrossReturnt)−MVmgrt−2(1 +GrossReturnt−1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
= Flowt +NAVt−1 ×NetReturnt ×NSharest−1 + A+B (1.1)
The first term of the above equation is the net fund flow in period t, and the second
term is the earnings from the net return on existing assets of investors. The last two
terms A and B are the changes in accrued incentive fees and change in market value
of managers’ own investment respectively, which are both determined by returns. The
only variable in terms A and B is the GrossReturnt, which is solved from net return
and other fund parameters.15 All other terms in item A and B are lag values, which
are considered as constant. Therefore, we can simply rewrite the above equation as
follows.
15Term A is a function of AIFt, which is a function of GrossReturnt. See equation (A.4)
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AUMt − AUMt−1 = Flowt + f(NetReturnt) (1.2)
where f(NetReturnt) = NAVt−1 ×NetReturnt ×NSharest−1 + A+B
(1.3)
Using the above approach, we decompose the change in fund size (AUM) into a fund
flow part and a net return part. We find that, for individual funds, the change in
fund size is mostly driven by fund flow. For the median fund, net flows contribute to
71% of changes in assets under management, while only 29% of the changes in assets
are resulted from the net return on existing assets. This is a strong evidence that the
hedge fund compensation is mostly driven by fund flows.
We also find that this effect is not symmetric. When assets under management
decrease, 98% of the decrease in the size of the median fund is resulted from net fund
outflows. However, when assets under management increase, only 53% of the increase
in the size of the median fund is from net fund inflows.
To further explore the driving factor of the change in fund size, we check the
relative importance of fund flows by grouping yearly observations based on the sign
of fund flows and the sign of change in fund size. As reported in Table 1.6, we find
that in most cases, the change in fund size is consistent with the fund flows in their
signs (directions). When funds increase in size, 4819 observations incur fund inflows,
while only 1694 observations incur fund outflows. The consistence of signs in size
changes and fund flows is more significant when funds decrease in size. In this case,
4223 observations incur fund outflows, while only 450 observations incur fund inflows.
When the signs of size changes and fund flows are consistent, the mean ratio of fund
flow and change in fund size of all strategies are significant at 1%.
From Table 1.6, we also find that the impact of fund flows on the change in fund
size is not symmetric when fund size expands or shrink. When funds expand size with
net inflows in the same year, the mean (median) ratio of fund flow to the change in
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fund size is 80.98% (70.92%). When funds shrink in size with net outflows in the same
year, the proportion of fund flow in the change of fund size is 195.27% (102.26%). In
the latter case, both mean and median are greater than 1, indicating that the size of
fund outflow exceeds the change in fund size.
For observations with opposite signs of fund flow and change in fund size, the
mean of the proportion of fund flow in the change of fund size is much higher than
its mean, indicating that the results are mostly driven by extreme values in smaller
samples. In this case, median is a more representative of the impact of the flow to
the change in fund size. For observations with increase in size and fund outflows,
the median is -53.77%. For observations with decrease in size and fund inflows, the
median is -46.94%. Both ratios are lower in magnitude than those observations with
consistent signs of flow and change in fund size.
In summary, our results show that fund flow is the driving factor of the change in
fund size, and therefore of management fees. This effect is much stronger when funds
shrink in size. This is an evidence that investors can use fund flows to effectively
impact the compensation of hedge fund managers.
1.4.6 Hedge Fund Fee Structure and Managerial Incentives
In this section, we examine whether hedge fund managers with higher incentives,
which are measured by the high-water mark provision and total delta, have different
fee structure from the rest of the hedge fund sample.
Using the algorithm described in the Appendix, we empirically estimate the pay-
performance sensitivity (delta) of the manager’s compensation contract. As noted by
Agarwal et al. (2009b) and many other papers in literature, the incentive fee contract
of hedge fund manager resembles a portfolio of call options, where each option is
related to the fund flow and has its own strike price which depends on the high-water
mark and hurdle rate provisions of incentive contract.
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We estimate three measures of managerial incentives introduced by Agarwal et al.
(2009b), which are the total delta, manager’s option delta, and managerial ownership.
The total delta is the sum of manager’s option delta (coming from investors’ assets)
and the delta from the manager’s stake, which is market value of manager’s investment
in the fund multiplied by 0.01.16 Manager’s option delta is defined as the sensitivity
of option value to a one percent change in asset value. Managerial Ownership is a
fraction of the fund’s total assets that corresponds to the manager’s investment.
As shown in Table 1.7, the mean (median) total delta equals $0.21 million ($1.98
million). The total delta can be broken down to the manager’s option delta, with
a mean of $0.15 million and a median of $1.09 million, and the co-investment of
managers, with a mean of 3.66% (EW) or 6.14% (VW) of total assets and a median
of 2.64% of total assets. The co-investment of managers is on average $4.82 million
(EW), or $73.37 (VW). These results imply that large funds have higher managerial
incentives, which is consistent with the way that deltas are defined.17
As shown in Table 1.8, funds with higher managerial incentives, as measured by
high-water mark and total delta, are paid more dollar total fees. The dollar total
fees of funds with high-water mark provision is higher than other funds by about
$0.8 million, in both mean and median. The impact of total delta on the total
compensation is even stronger. Funds in the top quintile of total delta are paid dollar
total fee at $16.8 million in mean, and $15.2 million in median, which far exceed the
total compensation of the other quintiles of total delta. Our results imply that the
highest compensation is concentrated in funds with the highest managerial incentives.
Table 1.8 also shows a negative relation between the managerial incentives and the
percentage of management fee in total fee. For funds with high-water mark provision
16Agarwal et al. (2009b) assume that managers reinvest all the collected incentive fees in the fund,
following the practice of industry practitioners.
17As shown in equation (A.1), the manager’s option delta is proportional to the size of investors’
assets.
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and funds with higher total delta, management fee takes a lower proportion in total
fee. This result is consistent with Agarwal et al. (2009b) in that funds with higher
managerial incentives tend to outperform other funds. Therefore, the high-incentive
funds can earn more incentive fees relative to other funds.
We find mixed results as to the relation between managerial incentives and the
proportion of total fee in the gross asset value. As shown in Table 1.8, although funds
with high-water mark provision earn a lower percentage of total fee, the difference is
very small, only 0.14%. Total delta are positively related with the total fee percentage.
The difference of the total fee percentage between the top and bottom quintiles of
total delta is as much as 1%. This means that the managers’ of top total delta quintile
earn 1% more of the asset value in their compensation than the managers of the lowest
total delta quintile. As we have mentioned earlier, the funds with the highest deltas
tend to be larger funds, our results imply that the compensation of funds in the top
delta quintile is higher than funds in the lowest delta quintile, even after it is scaled
by the gross asset values. Considering the size of these funds in the top delta quintile,
the size of the compensation difference is also economically significant.
In summary, our results support that funds with higher managerial incentives
tend to have better performance as well as better compensation. Delta of incentive
contracts is a good measure of managerial incentives, and has a significant impact on
hedge fund fee structure. This can be explained by the fact that the magnitude of
delta is determined by both incentive contract provisions and the fund size.
1.4.7 Does Size Matter for the Performance and Compensation of Hedge
Fund Managers?
Our results provide evidence that fund size matters for hedge fund performance
as well as the compensation of hedge fund managers. One the one hand, larger size
means more management fees. Actually, as shown in Table 1.8, the total fee of funds
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in top AUM quintile far exceeds that of the smaller funds. The result implies that
the best paid hedge funds are the ones largest in size. On the other hand, as shown
in Table 1.8, hedge fund returns are also positively related with fund size. These
together explain why the value-weighted fee measures are usually higher than the
equally-weighted fee measures in our analysis, and why funds with higher deltas tend
to be paid more.
As shown in Table 1.8, similar to the results for quintiles of deltas, the top quintile
of AUM is lowest in the proportion of management fee in total fee, and the highest
in the total fee percentage in gross asset value. These results support the fact that
large funds tend to perform better, earn more, and rely less on management fees for
their compensation.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we extend the annual algorithm of empirical estimation of fees and
gross returns introduced by Agarwal et al. (2009b) to a monthly algorithm which
also allows the accrual of incentive fees and inclusion of management fees. Using the
algorithm, we are able to explore the role of management fees and fund flows in the
compensation and their relation with the incentives of hedge fund managers. From
our analysis, management fee is economically important in size and can not be ignored
in the analysis of hedge fund incentives. We find that on average, management fee
amounts to over half of the total compensation for all hedge fund strategies. By
further decomposing the change in fund size, we find that the driving force of the
change in fund size, and ultimately of the management fees, is fund flows rather than
net returns. We find that for median funds, net flows contribute to 71% of changes
in assets under management, while only 29% of the changes in assets are resulted
from the net return on existing assets. When fund is shrinking in size, this effect is
more dramatic, and 98% of change in fund size is determined by fund outflows. Our
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results also show that funds with higher managerial incentives tend to have better
performance as well as better compensation.
Our findings also shed light on the importance of fund size to the performance and
compensation of hedge funds. We find that the best paid hedge funds concentrate in
the top quintile of fund size. Large funds tend to perform better, earn more, and rely
less on management fee for their compensation.
All the above evidences support our argument that fund flow is an important
determinant of hedge fund managerial incentives. Together with the “visible” hands
of hedge fund management, i.e. the provisions of hedge fund incentive contracts,
the “invisible” hands– fund flows, have significant impact on hedge fund managerial
compensation and incentives.
This paper provides a flexible framework for future research on the impact of fund
flows on hedge fund compensations and risks, and the manager’s incentives. We can
develop more studies based on our algorithm and results, and try to answer questions
like: How does the proportion of incentive fees change with fund flows? How does
the pay-performance sensitivity change with fund flows? More specifically, it would
be interesting to see how the “active” flows could affect the performance and fees of
hedge fund, where active flows are defined as fund inflow when a hedge fund does not
beat its high-water mark and fund outflow when a fund beat its high-water mark.
Considering our finding that 55.4% of the observations have opposite signs for fund
flows and net returns, it would be interesting to see if and how the “active” flows
make things different.
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Table 1.4. Management Fee Ratios Over Time and For Different Fund Ages
In this table, we report the descriptive statistics of fees from January 1994 to
April 2010. Panel A reports the time-series statistics of all funds, and panel B
reports the statistics by fund age. MF/GAV is the ratio of the monthly
management fee to gross asset value, annualized by multiplying by 12.
MF/TotalFee is the ratio of the annual management fee to the annual total fee,
while ∆MF/∆TotalFee is the ratio of the change in annual management fee to
the change in annual total fee. Statistics are calculated by fund, then averaged
cross-sectionally. Only full-year fund data are used in the calculations. Statistics
of funds with ages older than 16 years are not reported, as only less than 70 funds
are in this sample.
Panel A: Management Fee Ratios Over Time
Year N
MF/TotalFee (Ann. %) ∆MF/∆TotalFee (Ann. %)
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev
1994 2 37.85 37.85 20.85
1995 10 57.70 45.99 37.77 66.08 66.08 64.95
1996 82 48.11 32.51 34.66 30.79 18.88 43.70
1997 176 52.42 38.01 35.26 1.51 14.63 248.81
1998 265 68.04 80.21 34.78 62.56 6.57 324.97
1999 373 41.44 27.85 35.16 30.43 4.63 227.68
2000 450 62.54 59.64 34.84 36.62 1.24 386.15
2001 596 64.88 65.73 31.71 65.49 19.95 275.30
2002 814 71.70 89.58 31.31 71.88 25.96 669.85
2003 956 43.46 32.74 30.51 33.20 6.35 391.61
2004 1056 53.14 44.79 29.70 47.60 14.42 872.97
2005 1181 57.67 51.73 29.73 -28.33 14.13 951.95
2006 1353 46.70 37.37 27.87 11.43 11.36 275.59
2007 1238 52.91 45.02 30.69 47.33 7.23 635.46
2008 1253 87.79 100.00 24.36 22.69 6.17 260.50
2009 1427 60.74 60.93 33.60 40.58 25.84 458.76
31
Panel B: Management Fee Ratios Of Different Fund Ages
Age N
MF/TotalFee (Ann. %) ∆MF/∆TotalFee (Ann. %)
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev
2 1069 55.47 48.20 32.84
3 1604 56.84 50.23 32.83 59.03 14.87 888.49
4 1597 59.37 55.23 32.94 61.07 10.69 662.73
5 1441 60.57 57.38 33.01 12.62 11.33 308.02
6 1124 60.76 57.07 32.65 20.23 11.93 352.78
7 907 58.79 52.17 32.99 26.98 7.12 431.05
8 770 59.79 54.30 33.51 58.19 12.12 633.28
9 630 59.44 52.79 32.67 38.03 9.05 448.50
10 494 61.65 57.69 33.29 15.82 9.41 170.70
11 411 59.42 53.10 33.27 29.91 12.33 113.35
12 316 61.94 60.03 33.59 19.96 10.17 126.33
13 248 63.61 64.70 34.55 11.97 10.09 296.25
14 174 55.59 48.85 34.38 34.85 8.08 177.14
15 132 57.18 49.72 34.05 32.96 3.71 363.98
16 106 61.57 60.77 35.52 -253.30 10.38 2700.82
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Table 1.6. Decomposition of the Change in Fund Size
In this table, we report the summary statistics of the ratio of annual fund flow and
annual change in AUM, as given by equation (1), for all funds and for each category
from January 1994 to April 2010. Panel A (B) reports statistics when both the sign of
fund flow and change in AUM are positive (negative). Panel C (D) reports statistics
based on observations when fund inflow (outflow) occurs while there is an decrease
(increase) in AUM. The mean and median statistics are reported in percentage. Only
full-year observations with non-zero flow and AUM are used in the calculation of the
statistics.
Panel A: Sign(∆AUM) = Sign(Flow) = 1
PrimaryCategory
Flow/∆AUM
N Mean Median t-stat Prob(t)
Convertible Arbitrage 248 76.05 80.39 36.63 0.00
Dedicated Short Bias 44 231.88 86.63 2.59 0.01
Emerging Markets 459 74.82 59.54 11.97 0.00
Equity Market Neutral 408 83.60 81.10 26.37 0.00
Event Driven 758 77.72 71.87 22.02 0.00
Fixed Income Arbitrage 278 71.92 74.20 30.09 0.00
Global Macro 339 94.70 79.91 10.82 0.00
Long/Short Equity Hedge 2285 79.52 66.98 29.79 0.00
All Funds 4819 80.98 70.92 43.63 0.00
Panel B: Sign(∆AUM) = Sign(Flow) = -1
PrimaryCategory
Flow/∆AUM
N Mean Median t-stat Prob(t)
Convertible Arbitrage 242 243.17 106.04 5.40 0.00
Dedicated Short Bias 35 115.74 85.80 4.78 0.00
Emerging Markets 468 190.68 94.76 7.82 0.00
Equity Market Neutral 363 146.14 103.90 12.69 0.00
Event Driven 512 176.82 106.89 11.40 0.00
Fixed Income Arbitrage 241 200.26 112.95 8.21 0.00
Global Macro 271 169.60 101.96 10.62 0.00
Long/Short Equity Hedge 2091 207.89 99.33 9.80 0.00
All Funds 4223 195.27 102.26 17.00 0.00
35
Panel C: Sign(∆AUM) = 1; Sign(Flow) = -1
PrimaryCategory
Flow/∆AUM
N Mean Median t-stat Prob(t)
Convertible Arbitrage 72 -580.95 -73.85 -1.37 0.17
Dedicated Short Bias 6 -160.64 -82.41 -2.32 0.07
Emerging Markets 313 -323.89 -40.95 -4.38 0.00
Equity Market Neutral 96 -272.83 -42.27 -3.59 0.00
Event Driven 208 -331.60 -70.79 -6.23 0.00
Fixed Income Arbitrage 69 -281.93 -68.77 -4.02 0.00
Global Macro 84 -610.58 -52.27 -1.27 0.21
Long/Short Equity Hedge 846 -379.17 -53.85 -3.34 0.00
All Funds 1694 -372.41 -53.77 -5.64 0.00
Panel D: Sign(∆AUM) = - 1; Sign(Flow) = 1
PrimaryCategory
Flow/∆AUM
N Mean Median t-stat Prob(t)
Convertible Arbitrage 15 -4618.08 -105.92 -1.03 0.32
Dedicated Short Bias 9 -134.05 -52.60 -1.97 0.08
Emerging Markets 86 -104.97 -39.02 -5.03 0.00
Equity Market Neutral 27 -129.33 -29.78 -2.83 0.01
Event Driven 31 -153.89 -52.85 -3.19 0.00
Fixed Income Arbitrage 17 -77.56 -30.21 -2.88 0.01
Global Macro 15 -109.07 -33.73 -2.22 0.04
Long/Short Equity Hedge 250 -581.53 -56.20 -1.98 0.05
All Funds 450 -524.68 -46.94 -2.37 0.02
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Figure 1.1. Average AUM Over Time
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CHAPTER 2
RETURN SMOOTHING, MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES,
AND HEDGE FUND FAILURES
2.1 Introduction
The hedge fund industry has grown dramatically in the past decades, and gained
popularity among institutional investors due to limited regulatory oversight, advan-
tageous fee structures, and the flexibility in investment strategies.
Hedge fund returns are often highly serially correlated. Getmansky et al. (2004a)
document an average serial correlation of 12.1% for reported monthly hedge fund
returns. The serial correlation in hedge fund returns could also bias the risk-adjusted
return measures, such as the Sharpe ratio. Lo (2002) finds that annualized Sharpe
ratios can be overstated dramatically (up to 65%) due to the presence of serial cor-
relation in the monthly returns of hedge funds. Moreover, spurious serial correlation
can lead to wealth transfers between new, existing, and departing investors.1
As suggested by Getmansky et al. (2004a), serial correlation could be a proxy of
illiquidity in hedge fund investments. Share restrictions for fund withdrawal, such as
lockup period and redemption period, are common among hedge funds. These share
restrictions discourage capital withdrawal of investors and allow managers to have the
discretion to invest in illiquid assets more easily. These share restrictions have impacts
on the performance of hedge funds, as well as their flow-performance relations. Aragon
(2007) finds that the excess returns of funds with lockup restrictions are approximately
4-7% per year higher than those of nonlockup funds. Ding et al. (2009) find that
1See Boudoukh et al. (2002) and Cumming and Dai (2010).
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individual hedge funds exhibit different flow-performance relationships, depending on
the presence of share restrictions.
Intentional return smoothing is also a possible explanation for the high serial cor-
relation in hedge fund returns. The special fee structure and the lack of transparency
allow the possibility that hedge fund managers may misreport their returns in order
to charge more fees. Intentional return smoothing is possible if there is some flexi-
bility on the valuation of the assets traded by the funds. Misreporting of hedge fund
returns has been observed and analyzed in recent studies, including Agarwal et al.
(2009a), Bollen and Pool (2009), and Cumming and Dai (2010). Due to the lack of
information, it is hard to disentangle discretionary return smoothing from illiquidity
as causes of serial correlation in returns. A few recent studies address this question
in different aspects. Bollen and Pool (2008) try to distinguish purposeful managerial
smoothing from innocuous causes of serial correlation by applying a model of condi-
tional return smoothing. They show that if true returns are independently distributed
and a manager fully reports gains but delays reporting losses, then reported returns
will feature conditional serial correlation. Agarwal et al. (2009a) find spikes of re-
turns in December for hedge funds with greater incentives and greater opportunities
to inflate returns, which suggests that hedge funds manage their returns upwards in
an opportunistic fashion in order to earn higher fees. In this paper, we are interested
to see if managerial incentives are driving return smoothing. We will also explore the
illiquidity and return smoothing properties of failed hedge funds.
The compensation of hedge fund managers often features an asymmetric fee struc-
ture. Hedge fund investors are generally charged an annual management fee that can
range anywhere from 1% to 3% of assets under management, and also an incentive
fee which is typically between 15% and 25% of annual profits, based upon the fund’s
overall performance. The high-water mark for each investor is the maximum share
value since his or her initial investment in the fund. High-water mark contracts have
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the appealing feature that each investor only pays performance fees when the value
of their investment is greater than its previous highest value, which ensures that
an investor only pays an incentive fee for positive performance once any previous
underperformance has been recouped.
Higher incentive fees and high-water mark provisions have been associated with
better performance of hedge funds (See Liang (1999), Ackermann et al. (1999), etc.).
A few recent papers explore the impact of other measures of managerial incentives
on the performance and management of hedge funds. Agarwal et al. (2009b) use the
delta of the option-like incentive fee contracts, higher levels of managerial ownership,
and the inclusion of high-water mark provisions in the incentive contracts as mea-
sures of managerial incentives. They find that hedge fund managerial incentives are
associated with superior performance. Agarwal et al. (2009a) find that funds with
greater managerial incentives exhibit more December return spikes, which is an indi-
cator of managed returns in hedge funds. However, none of these studies explore the
relation between managerial incentives and serial correlation of fund returns. In this
paper, we will examine if the return smoothing of hedge funds is related to managerial
incentives.
We argue that gross returns should be used for the study of return smoothing.
One reason is that gross returns are more relevant to the process and causes of return
smoothing. The risk management and return smoothing of hedge fund managers are
directly related to the performance of hedge funds gross of all fees. Specifically, the
valuation of (illiquid) assets and intentional returns smoothing both take place before
the calculation and deduction of fees. So gross returns provide a clearer picture of
hedge fund liquidity and they are also more appropriate for the estimation of return
smoothing. However, due to the availability of data and the complexity of calculation,
most studies of hedge funds in literature use net returns and net asset values in their
analysis. Gross returns are rarely used in previous studies. For the estimation of gross
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returns and measures of managerial incentives, we follow the monthly algorithm of
Feng et al. (2010), which is an extended version of Agarwal et al. (2009b) that allows
accrual of incentive fees, monthly estimation, and inclusion of management fees.
Another reason that gross returns should be used for the studies of return smooth-
ing is that the asymmetric structure of fees results in the difference between the dis-
tribution of gross returns and that of net returns. Unlike mutual funds, the gross
return of hedge funds is not just a percentage of net returns, but bears a more com-
plex distributional feature. As shown in the later part of this paper, statistics such as
the mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis are all different between gross
returns and net returns. For the majority of funds in the sample, the difference be-
tween statistics of these two return measures is significant. Therefore, it is important
to examine the properties of gross returns separately from net returns for the studies
of return smoothing and other gross-of-fee properties of fund performance.
In this paper, we examine if the estimated return smoothing profile and smoothing-
adjusted Sharpe ratio using gross returns are significantly different from those using
net returns. We also analyze the impacts of managerial incentives on the uncondi-
tional and conditional return smoothing of hedge funds, and examine if the managers
of hedge funds with more return smoothing earn more incentive fees. Finally, we
explore the return smoothing properties of the failed hedge funds, where the failure
of hedge funds is defined using performance measures.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. It is the first study to use
gross returns in the estimation of the unconditional and conditional return smooth-
ing models. This paper is also the first paper to examine the relationship between
managerial incentives and return smoothing, and the dollar amount of fees charged
by managers with different smoothing properties. We also add to the literature of
hedge fund failures by linking return smoothing to the failures of hedge funds.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 gives a review of re-
lated literature. Section 2.3 describes the data. Section 2.4 introduces the return
smoothing models used in the paper. Section 2.5 presents the empirical analysis of
return smoothing. Section 2.6 concludes the paper. The algorithm of gross returns
and deltas is provided in the Appendix.
2.2 Literature Review
Recent literature studies the liquidity of hedge fund investment and observes serial
correlation in hedge fund returns. Getmansky et al. (2004a) document substantial
positive serial correlation in reported monthly hedge fund returns with an average
level of 12.1% for a sample of 909 hedge funds in the TASS Hedge Fund database
after applying a filter of 5-year continuous life. Various sources of serial correlation
have been examined in Getmansky et al. (2004a) including time-varying expected
returns, time-varying leverage, and marking illiquid assets to market using extrapola-
tion. They find that the most likely explanation is illiquidity exposure and smoothed
returns. Li and Patton (2007) find evidence of time variation in the degree of liquid-
ity of hedge fund investments. They find hedge funds in equity-based styles exhibit
decreases in liquidity when stock market returns are low and bond market returns
are high. In contrast, hedge funds in fixed income styles exhibit lower liquidity when
equity market volatility is high, and when the fund experiences inflows or outflows of
funds.
As pointed out by Getmansky et al. (2004a), serial correlation can be caused
by purposeful managerial smoothing of contemporaneous and lagged asset returns.
Bollen and Pool (2008) try to distinguish purposeful managerial smoothing from
innocuous causes of serial correlation by applying a model of conditional return
smoothing. They use conditional serial correlation as a measure of conditional re-
turn smoothing, and show that if true returns are independently distributed and a
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manager fully reports gains but delays reporting losses, then reported returns will
feature conditional serial correlation. Bollen and Pool (2008) use a logit regression to
model the relationship between conditional return smoothing and fund flows, and find
that the probability of observing conditional serial correlation is positively related to
the volatility of investor cash flows and negatively related to the magnitude of in-
vestor cash flows, which provides evidence that conditional smoothing may happen
in response to the risk of capital flight.
The illiquidity and smoothed returns may bias the risk-adjusted performance mea-
sures. Asness et al. (2001) note that illiquid assets held by hedge funds can lead to
changes in hedge fund values that are non-synchronous with changes in common
benchmarks. If reported hedge fund values are stale, traditional estimates of volatil-
ity and correlation with benchmarks can be biased downward, thereby improving the
risk-adjusted performance of the funds. Lo (2002) finds that annualized Sharpe ratio
can be overstated dramatically (up to 65%) due to presence of serial correlation in the
monthly returns of hedge funds. Smoothing-adjusted Sharpe ratio is introduced by
Lo (2002), and Getmansky et al. (2004a) introduce estimator of smoothing-adjusted
Sharpe ratio for small samples.
To enable managers to have more discretion of investing in illiquid assets, hedge
funds often have share restrictions on fund withdrawal such as lockup period and
redemption period. Aragon (2004) finds that the excess returns of funds with lockup
restrictions are approximately 4-7% per year higher than those of nonlockup funds.
He also finds that restrictions on shareholder activity are more common in younger
hedge funds and are positively related to the level of smoothing. He suggests that
share restrictions allow funds to effectively manage illiquid assets, and these benefits
are captured by investors as a share illiquidity premium. Ding et al. (2009) find that
the convexity of flow-performance relation varies with the share restrictions. Hedge
funds exhibit a convex flow performance relation in the absence of share restrictions,
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but exhibit a concave relation in the presence of restrictions. They argue that this is
resulted from both the direct effect and the indirect effect of the binding restrictions,
as investors may endogenize expected future binding restrictions when investing their
money. They also find that live funds exhibit a concave flow-performance relation
due to stricter flow restrictions than defunct funds, which display a convex relation.
As pointed out by Lo (2001), for portfolios of illiquid securities, i.e., securities that
are not frequently traded and for which there may not be a well-established market
price, a hedge-fund manager has considerable discretion in marking the portfolio’s
value at the end of each month to arrive at the fund’s net asset value (NAV). Given the
nature of hedge-fund compensation contracts and performance statistics, managers
have incentives to “smooth” their returns by marking their portfolios to less than
their actual value in months with large positive returns so as to create a “cushion”
for those months with lower returns. Such return smoothing behavior yields a more
consistent set of returns over time with lower volatility and, therefore, a higher Sharpe
ratio, but it also produces serial correlation as a side effect. The more illiquid the
portfolio, the more discretion the manager has in marking its value and smoothing
returns, creating serial correlation in the process. Cumming and Dai (2010) also show
misreporting significantly affects capital allocation, and calculate the wealth transfer
effects of misreporting and relate this wealth transfer to differences in hedge fund
regulation.
Evidence of possible hedge fund return manipulation is found in some recent stud-
ies of misreported returns of hedge fund. Bollen and Pool (2009) find that the number
of small gains far exceeds the number of small losses, which is caused at least in part
by temporarily overstated returns. Cumming and Dai (2010) further investigate the
relation between hedge fund regulations and the misreported returns observed in
Bollen and Pool (2009). They find a positive association between wrappers and mis-
reporting, particularly for funds that do not have a lockup provision. They also find
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some evidence that misreporting is less common among funds in jurisdictions with
minimum capitalization requirements and restrictions on the location of key service
providers. Agarwal et al. (2009a) find the spike of returns in December for hedge
funds with greater incentives and greater opportunities to inflate returns, which sug-
gests that hedge funds manage their returns upwards in an opportunistic fashion in
order to earn higher fees. They also provide strong evidence that funds inflate De-
cember returns by under-reporting returns earlier in the year, but only weak evidence
that funds borrow from January returns in the following year.
Recent studies also link return smoothing to hedge fund failures and frauds. Get-
mansky et al. (2004b) document the difference in illiquidity risk between active and
liquidated funds for 1765 hedge funds in TASS database from 1977 to 2004. They find
that graveyard funds exhibit less illiquidity exposure as measured by the serial corre-
lation and the MA(2) smoothed return model of Getmansky et al. (2004a). They also
proposed three possible explanations for the difference, including i) live funds may
control risks better and, as a result, tend to have smoother returns. ii) funds with
smoother returns are more attractive to investors and, therefore, have greater staying
power. iii) funds with more illiquidity risk are, on average, compensated for bearing
such risk, which in turn implies stronger performance and greater asset-gathering
abilities. Bollen and Pool (2008) study the conditional serial correlation in the hedge
fund fraud cases recently investigated by the SEC, and find evidence that conditional
serial correlation is a leading indicator of fraud.
Goetzmann et al. (2003) point out that the incentive fee contract in hedge funds
provides the manager with a call option and theoretically model the value of this
option. When a hedge fund receives capital flows at different points in time, the
incentive fee contract resembles a portfolio of call options, where each option is related
to the capital inflow at a given point in time and has its own strike price (dictated by
the NAV at the time of entry and whether the fund has hurdle rate and high-water
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mark provisions). Following the insights of Goetzmann et al. (2003), Agarwal et al.
(2009b) empirically estimate the moneyness and delta of this portfolio of call options.
They find that the deltas of the portfolio of incentive contracts are better measures
of managerial incentives relative to incentive fee rates.
Managerial incentives and operational risks have been associated with hedge fund
performance and misreported returns in some recent studies. Agarwal et al. (2009b)
find that hedge funds with greater managerial incentives, proxied by the delta of the
option-like incentive fee contracts, higher levels of managerial ownership, and the in-
clusion of high-water mark provisions in the incentive contracts, are associated with
superior performance. Agarwal et al. (2009a) find that funds with greater incentives
and greater opportunities to inflate returns exhibit return spikes in December. Cas-
sar and Gerakos (2009) study the mechanisms used to price the funds investment
positions and report the funds performance to investors to differentiate between as-
set illiquidity and misreporting-based explanations. They find that funds using less
verifiable pricing sources and funds that provide managers with greater discretion in
pricing investment positions are more likely to have returns consistent with intentional
smoothing.
2.3 Data
We use the hedge fund data from Lipper TASS database. TASS has monthly
net-of-fee returns, assets under management, and other fund characteristics, such as
hurdle rates and high-water mark provisions, lockup, notice, and redemption periods,
incentive fees, management fees, inception dates, and fund strategies. TASS also
classifies hedge funds into 12 strategies: Convertible Arbitrage, Dedicated Short Bias,
Emerging Markets, Equity Market Neutral, Event Driven, Fixed Income Arbitrage,
Global Macro, Long/Short Equity Hedge, Managed Futures, Multi-Strategy, Fund
of Funds, and Options Strategy. TASS reports two separate databases, one with
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“live” funds and another with “graveyard” funds, which keeps track of funds that
stop reporting and starts in 1994. Our sample period extends from January 1994 to
April 2010. We include both live and graveyard databases and focus on the post-1994
period to mitigate the potential survival-ship bias. As of April 2010, there are 14,177
hedge funds, out of which 5,989 are operational, while 8,188 became defunct during
our sample period.
We exclude funds that i) report gross returns, ii) have missing information on
management fee or incentive fee,2 iii) do not report continuously and monthly, and
iv) are in the categories of funds of funds, or managed futures, or “other” hedge funds,
or have missing strategy information.3 We delete observations that are backfilled to
eliminate backfill bias.4
There are additional steps we take to obtain a continuous track of the asset un-
der management (thereafter, AUM ) and net asset value (thereafter, NAV ) for the
algorithm of gross returns and managerial incentives. We delete observations with
missing or stale AUM at the beginning or the end of the fund performance history.5
We also interpolate the missing or stale AUM for up to 3 months, and then keep the
longest continuous interval of each fund. We require at least 60 months of returns,
and winsorize fund flows at top and bottom 1%.
After these data cleaning steps, we have 1,033 funds in our sample, out of which
539 are live funds and 494 are graveyard funds. The number of funds in each category
of live and graveyard databases is given in Table 1.
2If both rates are reported zero, then the fund is also eliminated from the sample.
3We exclude funds of funds since it has different fee structure from other fund strategies, see
Brown et al. (2004). We exclude managed futures and “other” hedge funds since these categories
are not usually considered “typical” hedge funds.
4The observation is defined as backfilled if the performance date is before “DateAddedToTass”
5Asset Under Management is defined as missing if it is not reported or reported as zero; it is
defined as stale if it is equal to its value of the previous month.
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AUM6 and NAV are converted to US dollar, if the original currency is not US
dollar. The monthly exchange rates and the three-month London Interbank Offered
Rate (LIBOR) of US dollar are downloaded from Bloomberg. The data of trend
following factors of Fung and Hsieh (2001) are downloaded from David A. Hsieh’s
website 7, and the other factors used in Fung and Hsieh (2001) are downloaded from
Yahoo! Finance 8. The Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Indices used in the
conditional return smoothing model are from the Lipper Tass Database.
2.4 Models
In section 2.4.1, we briefly review the unconditional return smoothing model in
Getmansky et al. (2004a). In section 2.4.2, we review the conditional return smooth-
ing model in Bollen and Pool (2008).
2.4.1 Unconditional Return Smoothing Model
Getmansky et al. (2004a) examine the econometric properties of reported hedge
fund returns by specifying a linear factor model for asset returns and a moving average
algorithm that transforms asset returns to reported returns.
We denote by Rt the true return of a hedge funds assets in period t, and assume
Rt satisfies the following linear single-factor model:
Rt = µ+ βΛt + εt, E[Λt] = E[εt] = 0,Λt, εt ∼ independent
V ar(Rt) ≡ σ2 (2.1)
6“EstimatedAssets” in TASS
7http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/DataLibrary/TF-FAC.xls
8http://finance.yahoo.com
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The return of hedge funds assets is known by the funds manager. The reported return
of the hedge fund, which is observable by the econometrician, is denoted by ROt , and
let
ROt = θ0Rt + θ1Rt−1 + · · ·+ θkRt−k (2.2)
θj ∈ [0, 1], j = 0, · · · , k (2.3)
and
1 = θ0 + θ1 + · · ·+ θk (2.4)
which is a weighted average of the funds true returns over the most recent k + 1
periods, including the current period. The constraint equation (2.4) that the weights
sum up to 1 implies that the information driving the fund’s performance in period t
will eventually be fully reflected in the observed returns, but this process take up to
k+ 1 periods from the time the information is generated. From (2.2) to (2.4), the de-
meaned observed returns process Xt = R
O
t − µ is a moving-average process of order
k; or an MA(k). Thus, the smoothing profiles can be estimated using maximum-
likelihood estimation.
Getmansky et al. (2004a) also introduce a summary statistic for measuring the
concentration of weights, called as “smoothing index”, which is defined as follows:
ξ ≡
k∑
j=0
θ2j ∈ [0, 1] (2.5)
Getmansky et al. (2004a) suggest that serial correlation is a proxy for illiquidity and
smoothed returns. Lower values of smoothing coefficient θ0 and smoothing index ξ
imply more illiquidity and more smoothed returns.
As stated in Bollen and Pool (2008), the observed returns generated by (2.2) can
reflect both conservatism when marking to market and intentionally dampening the
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observed return process to lower the funds apparent risk. One must be able to distin-
guish between the two sources of smoothed returns to identify fraudulent reporting.
In the unconditional model, however, the two sources of smoothed returns are ob-
servationally equivalent. Bollen and Pool (2008) try to the distinguish purposeful
managerial smoothing from innocuous causes of serial correlation by modeling the
conditional return smoothing based on conditional serial correlation.
2.4.2 Conditional Return Smoothing Model
The smoothing algorithm in equation (2.2) is unconditional in the sense that a
fraction θ0 of the asset return is reported contemporaneously with the remainder
reflected in future fund returns, regardless of the value of the asset return. Bollen
and Pool (2008) conjecture that competition in the hedge fund industry and the
standard compensation scheme for hedge fund managers provide an incentive for
a more complex behavior. They argue that managers have an incentive to affect
the shape of the reported return distribution in order to make it more attractive to
investors. During periods of large positive returns, managers are more likely to fully
report fund returns for the fear of lagging behind competitors. During periods of
large negative returns, managers may only partially report fund returns to mitigate
capital flight.
Bollen and Pool (2008) augment the smoothing algorithm (2.2) to include indicator
variables that capture the conditional smoothing:
ROt =
k∑
j
(θj(1− It−j) + ψjIt−j)Rt−j (2.6)
It−j = 1 if Rt−j > c for j = 0, · · · , k (2.7)
It−j = 0 if < c for j = 0, · · · , k (2.8)
For serial correlation with one lag, the above model can be written as
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ROt = a+ (b
−
1 (1− It−1) + b+1 It−1)ROt−1 + ηt (2.9)
where It−1 = 1 if Rt−1 > c and zero otherwise. If a manager tends to defer reporting
poor returns, then the relation between contemporaneous and lagged returns will be
larger when the lagged returns are poor, i.e., b−1 > b
+
1 .
In later parts of this paper, we will use the conditional serial correlation model
following Bollen and Pool (2008):
ROt = a+ b
+
1 R
O
t−1 + b
−
1 (1− It−1)ROt−1 + ηt (2.10)
where ROt is the observed gross return in month t. It−1 = 1 if the fund’s systematic
return from an optimal factor model at month t-1 is greater than the mean systematic
return. Both Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund indices and the asset-based style
(ABS) factors developed by Fung and Hsieh (2004), as well as S&P 500 returns are
used as available factors in determining It−1.9
2.5 Empirical Analysis
This section describes our empirical analysis and interprets the results. In sec-
tion 2.5.1, we present summary statistics for the sample of hedge funds included
in our analysis. We implement the models of unconditional return smoothing and
conditional smoothing in section 2.4 for each of the funds. Section 2.5.2 reports the
estimation of the unconditional return smoothing profiles and the smoothing-adjusted
Sharpe ratios, using both gross returns and net returns, and compare the results be-
tween gross returns and net returns. Section 2.5.3 examines fund characteristics that
9We follow Bollen and Pool (2008), and use stepwise regression to select for a given fund the
subset of factors whose contemporaneous and lagged observations maximize the explanatory power
(adjusted R2) of the factor model. We also use feasible generalized least squares with one lag to
account for the serial correlation in residuals.
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are related to the unconditional serial correlation of hedge fund returns. Section 2.5.4
computes the frequency with which we observe conditional serial correlation. Section
2.5.5 examines fund characteristics that are related to the probability of observing
conditional serial correlation. Section 2.5.6 compares dollar incentive fees paid to
funds with different degree of return smoothing. Section 2.5.7 examines the return
smoothing properties of failed hedge funds in our sample.
2.5.1 Summary Statistics
Table 2.2 contains the basic summary statistics for the 1033 funds in our sample.
Both gross returns and net returns are used in the computation of all statistics. There
are a lot of variation in mean returns across categories. Emerging markets, Event
Driven, Global Macro, and Long/Short Equity Hedge are the strategies with higher
mean returns than the other categories. The average gross return is 1.10% monthly,
which is higher than the average net returns by 0.32% monthly (i.e. 3.84% annually).
For the whole sample, the average standard deviation of monthly gross returns is
4.39%, which is 0.43% higher than that of the net returns. This may be explained
by the magnitude of gross returns relative to net returns, as well as the asymmetric
incentive contract with high-water mark and hurdle rates. Consistent with the hedge
fund literature, funds in our sample are negatively skewed and leptokurtic. Seven of
the ten categories have negative skewness, and the average skewness of our sample is
-0.24 (using gross returns) and -0.43 (using net returns). All categories have positive
excess kurtosis, and the average kurtosis for the sample is 4.94 and 5.42, using gross
returns and net returns respectively.
As shown in Table 2.2, hedge funds represent serial correlation across categories.
On average, the first serial correlation is 18.92% and 18.81%, estimated using gross
returns and net returns respectively. For 8 of the 10 categories, gross returns have
higher first order serial correlation than net returns.
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By breaking the sample into the live and graveyard fund groups, we find that live
funds have higher serial correlation up to first three orders than the graveyard funds,
implying that live funds are more illiquid than the graveyard funds. We also find
that the difference between the first order serial correlation is only significant for the
graveyard fund sample.
566 (503) funds in our sample have significant positive serial correlation in gross
(net) returns. This amounts to more than half of our sample. Only 19 (20) funds in
our sample have significantly negative serial correlation based on gross (net) returns.
As stated in Getmansky et al. (2004a), serial correlation is a proxy for illiquidity
and smoothed returns of hedge fund. These statistics suggest that illiquidity and
smoothed returns are important attributes of hedge fund returns.
Table 2.3 reports the statistics of capital flows and fund characteristics. The
average monthly fund flow is 2.04% of the assets under management. There are a
lot of fluctuations in fund flows, and the standard deviation of monthly fund flow is
22.26%. The funds in our sample have an average (median) age of 125.12 months (116
months). The average fund size is $204.19 million. The lockup period and redemption
period are 4.48 months and 3.90 months on average, respectively. There are some
variations in lockup period and redemption period across strategies as well. Event
driven, Long/Short equity hedge, and Convertible Arbitrage are the categories with
the longest lockup and redemption periods. Emerging markets, Fixed Income Arbi-
trage, and Options Strategy have the shortest lockup period, and Emerging Markets,
Global Macro, and Options Strategy have the shortest redemption period.
The percentage rates of management fee and incentive fee, as well as the estimated
dollar amount of both fees are reported in Table 2.3. The average rates of management
fee and incentive fee are 1.34% and 18.91%, respectively. However, the difference
between the estimated dollar amount of management fee and incentive fee is smaller.
The average annual management fee per fund is $2,310,270, while the average annual
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incentive fee per fund is $3,781,340, which is 1.64 times the amount of the average
management fee.
As described previously, we estimate the measures of managerial incentives intro-
duced by Agarwal et al. (2009b), which are the total delta, manager’s option delta,
and managerial ownership. The total delta is the sum of manager’s option delta (com-
ing from investors’ assets) and the delta from the manager’s stake, which is market
value of manager’s investment in the fund multiplied by 0.01.10 Manager’s option
delta is defined as the sensitivity of option value to a one percent change in asset
value. In the Appendix, we describe the algorithm of computing the monthly delta
measures in Feng et al. (2010), which is an extension of the algorithm of delta in
Agarwal et al. (2009b), that allows for monthly fees and fund flows, accrual of in-
centive fees, and inclusion of management fees. As shown in Table 2.3, the mean
(median) total delta is $424,440 ($373,630). A breakdown of the total delta measure
indicates that the mean (median) manager’s option delta equals $232,840 ($206,360),
and the delta from the manager’s co-investment in the fund confitures the balance.
For our sample, the mean (median) managerial ownership, which is the ratio of our
estimate of the manager’s co-investment of previously-paid incentive fees to the total
assets under management, is 10.17% (7.15%).
2.5.2 Unconditional Return Smoothing
As previously stated, the risk management and return smoothing of hedge fund
managers are directly related with the performance of hedge funds gross of all fees.
Specifically, the valuation of assets and smoothing of returns both take place before
the calculation and deduction of fees. So gross returns provide a clearer picture of
hedge fund liquidity and it is also more appropriate for the estimation of return
10Agarwal et al. (2009b) assume that managers reinvest all the collected incentive fees in the fund,
following the practice of industry practitioners.
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smoothing. In this section, we estimate all return smoothing profiles using gross
returns, and examine the difference between the results using gross returns and using
net returns.
Table 2.4 presents the estimation of smoothing profiles and smoothing index for
each fund strategy, using the moving-average model of return smoothing in Getman-
sky et al. (2004a) reviewed in Section 2.4.1. Getmansky et al. (2004a) suggest using
the estimate of smoothing coefficient θ0 as a proxy of return smoothing and illiquidity.
The average value of θ0 is 0.849, implying that only 84.9% of the true current monthly
return would be reported, with the remaining 15.1% distributed over the next two
months. Six of the ten categories exhibit smaller average value of θ0 than the rest:
Convertible Arbitrage, Emerging Markets, Event Driven, Fixed Income Arbitrage,
Multi-strategy, and Options Strategy. Convertible Arbitrage has the lowest average
value of θ0, which is 0.644, implying that only 64.4% of the current monthly return
would be reported, with the remaining 35.6% distributed over the next two months.
The smoothing index ξ is also lower for these strategies.
As a robustness check, we also estimate the moving average model under the
alternative specification constraint σ = ˜σNW , where ˜σNW is the Newey-West standard
error. While not reported here, the results are similar.
Table 2.4 also compares the estimated return smoothing profiles and smoothing
indices of gross returns with those of net returns. For Emerging Markets, Equity
Market Neutral, and Long/Short Equity Hedge, the smoothing coefficient θ0 is signif-
icantly lower using gross returns than using net returns. These categories constitute
61.5% of all funds in our sample. For the whole sample, the average estimated θ0
using gross return is lower than that estimated using net return by 0.6%, and the
difference is significant at 1% level. The difference between smoothing profiles θ1 and
θ2 and the smoothing index ξ of gross returns and of net returns are all significant
at the 1% level. As lower smoothing profile θ0 and smoothing index ξ indicate more
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illiquidity and smoothed returns, these results imply that net returns tend to under-
estimate the illiquidity and return smoothing in the unconditional return smoothing
model.
We also estimate the risk-adjusted performance measure, i.e. the smoothing-
adjusted Sharpe ratio using gross returns, following Lo (2002). Our results confirms
the finding of Lo (2002) that annualized Sharpe ratio can be overstated dramatically
due to presence of serial correlation in the monthly returns of hedge fund. As shown
in Table 2.5, for eight out of ten categories in our sample, the standard Sharpe ratio
is significantly higher than the smoothing-adjusted Sharpe ratio. On average, the
annualized Sharpe ratio is overstated by 0.23 (0.18), equivalent to 22.5% (21.4%) of
the smoothing-adjusted Sharpe ratio of gross (net) returns.
We also compare the Sharpe ratios of gross returns with those of net returns. For
all categories, Sharpe ratios of gross returns are significantly higher. This is because
the higher level of gross returns dominates the higher volatility of gross returns. As
shown in Table 2.2, the average gross returns are higher than average net returns by
0.32% per month (i.e. 3.84% per year), which is equivalent to 41% of the net returns,
while the standard deviation of gross returns are only higher than net returns by 0.42,
which is equivalent to 11% of the standard deviation of net returns. These results
indicate that it is important that we calculate Sharpe ratios separately for gross
returns, when we study the risk-adjusted gross-of-fee performance of hedge funds.
In summary, we find that unconditional return smoothing profiles are significantly
underestimated using net returns, compared to using gross returns. Sharpe ratios of
gross returns are also significantly higher than those of net returns. These results
suggest the necessity to use gross returns in the estimation of unconditional return
smoothing, as well as the risk-adjusted gross-of-fee performance of hedge funds.
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2.5.3 The Determinants of Unconditional Return Smoothing
In this section, we determine whether managerial incentives or any fund charac-
teristics are systematically related to the degree of unconditional serial correlation.
As analyzed in Getmansky et al. (2004a), return smoothing may be resulted from
illiquidity as well as intentional smoothing of managers. Previous studies also suggest
cross-sectional predictions of the likelihood that a fund manager is manipulating
reported returns. Getmansky et al. (2004a) report an adjusted R2 of 17.7% in a cross-
sectional regression of fund smoothing profiles on a number of descriptive indicator
variables. They find that, on average, funds that are open to new investors exhibit
more smoothing than funds that are not. Bollen and Pool (2008) find that conditional
serial correlation is related to the volatility and magnitude of investor cash flows.
We analyze the determinants of serial correlation in subsamples as well as using
cross-sectional linear regressions. We estimate the smoothing profiles and smoothing
index for subgroups of three categories of variables: managerial incentives, fund flow
and performance, and fund characteristics, and examine whether different subsamples
exhibit significantly different smoothing profile and smoothing indices. The manage-
rial incentives category variables include total delta, manager’s option delta, and
managerial ownership as defined in Agarwal et al. (2009b), as well as dollar manage-
ment fees. The fund flow and performance category variables include the mean and
volatility of both capital flows (scaled by lag value of fund asset under management)
and the gross returns estimated over the calendar year. The fund characteristics
variables include lockup period, redemption period, age, and fund size.
From Table 2.6, we find that the smoothing coefficient θ0 is significantly lower for
funds with higher total delta and funds with higher manager’s option delta. The re-
sults imply that managerial incentives are associated with more illiquidity and return
smoothing. The difference between subgroups of managerial ownership is insignifi-
cant. Table 2.6 also reports lower smoothing coefficient θ0 for funds with higher dollar
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management fees. As suggested in Agarwal et al. (2009a), funds with higher dollar
management fees have greater incentives to manage returns. Our result is consistent
with their findings, and implies that these funds have more illiquidity and smoothed
returns.
As shown in Table 2.6, the smoothing coefficient θ0 is significantly lower for funds
with high volatility, implying that funds with more volatile returns tend to be less
liquid.
Table 2.6 shows that fund with longer redemption periods are significantly higher
in unconditional return smoothing. This is consistent with previous literature (See
Ding et al. (2009)) in that redemption period, along with other share restrictions, is
a measure of the illiquidity of the fund’s investment.
From Table 2.6, we also find that large funds exhibit higher unconditional serial
correlation than small funds, which implies that large funds are more illiquid or have
more return smoothing. As shown in Table 2.7, the measures of managerial incentives,
including total delta, manager’s option delta, and dollar amount of incentive fee and
management fee are all highly correlated with fund size, as the larger the fund is,
the higher compensation the fund manager may get for the same returns. Other
reasons that may explain the higher level of serial correlation of large funds include
the freedom for them to choose among assets, and better skills in managing the illiquid
assets.
We find that live funds exhibit more illiquidity and smoothed returns than the
graveyard funds. This result is consistent with the finding of Getmansky et al.
(2004b), and can be explained by three possible explanations they proposed. First,
live funds may control risks better and, as a result, tend to have smoother returns.
Second, funds with smoother returns are more attractive to investors and, therefore,
have greater staying power. Third, funds with more illiquidity risk are, on average,
compensated for bearing such risk, which in turn implies stronger performance and
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greater asset-gathering abilities. With additional information about the specific in-
vestment process of a given fund, it may be possible for an investor to determine
which one of these three explanations is most likely to apply on a case-by-case basis.
We do not find significant difference in unconditional serial correlation for high
and low groups of mean and volatility of fund flows, fund age, as well as groups of
different lockup periods.
The correlation matrix of smoothing profiles and other variables is reported in
Table 2.7. The smoothing coefficient θ0 is negatively correlated with total delta,
manager’s option delta, managerial ownership, dollar incentive fee, dollar manage-
ment fee, mean and volatility of capital flows, redemption period, fund age, as well
as fund size.
We also use cross-sectional regressions of unconditional serial correlation to see
how it is related with managerial incentives and other variables. As reported in Table
2.8, we consider three models. The dependent variable of the first two models is
logarithm of the smoothing coefficient θ0 as the dependent variable, and the dependent
variable of the third model is the logarithm of the ξ. In model 1, we include only
total delta and control variables such redemption period, age and Live dummy as
regressors. In model 2 and 3, we add the mean and volatility of gross returns and
of capital flows, and the strategy dummies as the regressors. As θ0, total delta, the
volatility of fund flows and gross returns, and redemption period are all highly skewed,
we use the logarithm of these variables to improve their distributional properties.
From Table 2.8, we find that managerial incentive, as measured by total delta,
is significant for all three models. It implies that the funds with more managerial
incentives tend to have more illiquidity and smoothed returns. Volatility of gross
returns is also significantly positive in model 2 and 3, implying that fund with less
volatile returns tend to be more illiquid.
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As previously discussed, share restrictions such as redemption period are con-
sidered as proxies of illiquidity, and have impacts on hedge fund performance and
flow-performance relationship (See Aragon (2007) and Ding et al. (2009).). It is not
surprising to find significantly negative coefficient of redemption period for all three
models of Table 2.8. The result confirms that funds with more illiquidity exhibit more
serial correlation.
In Table 2.8, the coefficient of the “Live” dummy is significantly negative for all
models, indicating that the funds in the “live” database have more illiquidity and
smoothed returns than the funds in the “graveyard” database.
In summary, the subsample analysis and cross-sectional regression of unconditional
return smoothing both support that hedge funds with higher managerial incentives
tend to exhibit more serial correlation.
2.5.4 Conditional Return Smoothing
To see how many funds exhibit conditional serial correlation, we run the regression
following Bollen and Pool (2008):
ROt = a+ b
+
1 R
O
t−1 + b
−
1 (1− It−1)ROt−1 + ηt (2.11)
where ROt is the observed gross return in month t, and It−1 = 1 if the fund’s systematic
return from an optimal factor model at month t-1 is greater than the mean systematic
return. Both Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund indices and the asset-based style
(ABS) factors developed by Fung and Hsieh (2004), as well as S&P 500 returns are
used as available factors in determining It−1. The conditional serial correlation is
defined by significant positive b−1 coefficient.
Table 2.9 lists, for each category, the number of funds and the number of funds
that feature b+1 and b
−
1 coefficients at the two-sided 5% level, when mean strategy
return or Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model are used to infer the indicator
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variable. As reported in Table 2.2, over half of the funds in sample feature positive
serial correlation. In Table 2.9, 28.75% (31.95%) of funds have significant positive b+1 ,
for the Credit Suisse/Tremont Indices model and the ABS factor model, respectively.
The Convertible arbitrage, Event Driven and Long/Short Equity Hedge categories
have the highest number of funds with positive serial correlation. Consistent with the
low number of reported fraud cases, the number of funds that feature a significant
positive b−1 are is low, 55 out of 1033 for indices model, and 42 for the ABS factors
model, 5.32% and 4.07% in percentage of the whole fund sample, respectively.
We also check the conditional return smoothing frequencies of the subsamples
of live and graveyard funds. The percentage of funds featuring conditional return
smoothing is higher in live funds than in graveyard funds for both models. However,
as we will discuss in later parts, the failed hedge fund sample has the higher frequency
of conditional return smoothing than both the live and graveyard subsamples.
2.5.5 The Determinants of Conditional Return Smoothing
In this section, we use the three categories of variables discussed in section 2.5.3
to analyze the determinants of conditional return smoothing.
We first count the number of funds that have conditional serial correlation, de-
tected by significant positive b−1 coefficients at the two-sided 5% level. Table 2.10
shows that subgroups of funds with greater incentives have more cases of conditional
serial correlation, where incentives are proxied by total delta, managerial option delta,
managerial ownership, and dollar management fee. The difference between the num-
ber of funds for high and low subgroups is significant only for managerial ownership
in the Credit Suissee/Tremont indices model. The insignificance of difference be-
tween subsamples of other managerial incentive measures may be explained by the
limited number of occurrence of conditional return smoothing. However, we do find
significant result for total delta in the regression analysis.
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Agarwal et al. (2009a) argue that funds with higher volatilities may be able to
hide returns management with greater ease. Consistent with this argument, we find
funds with higher volatility of gross returns are more likely to exhibit conditional
serial correlation, as reported in Table 2.10 for the model using mean strategy return.
From Table 2.10, we also find that funds with shorter redemption period have a
significant greater percentage of conditional serial correlation, as funds with shorter
redemption period have more incentives to manage returns.
Table 2.11 reports the cross-sectional analysis of conditional serial correlation us-
ing logit regressions. The dependent variable equals one if a fund features statistically
significant conditional serial correlation, and zero otherwise. We include the same re-
gressors as in the cross-sectional regressions of unconditional return smoothing model.
For both models, we find conditional serial correlation is positively associated
with higher managerial incentives (measured by total delta), lower gross returns,
and more opportunities to manage returns (measured by volatility of gross returns).
We also find funds with redemption period exhibit significant negative relation with
conditional serial correlation, in the model using Credit Suissee/Tremont indices for
indicator variable estimation. This is consistent with Agarwal et al. (2009a) in that
funds with shorter redemption period have more incentives to manage returns.
In summary, we find that conditional return smoothing is associated with greater
managerial incentives in both subsample analysis and cross-sectional regressions. Our
results imply that funds with greater managerial incentives are more likely to ma-
nipulate returns through conditional return smoothing. Further information and
investigation may be used in determining the existence of fraud for individual funds.
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2.5.6 Are Managers of “Return-Smoothing” Funds Paid More Incentive
Fees?
As discussed previously, unconditional serial correlation of returns is considered a
proxy for the illiquidity of hedge fund, and along the lines of Aragon (2007), hedge
funds with more illiquidity may earn liquidity premium. Hedge fund managers also
have the motivation for smoothing return, as they could earn more fees from the
smoothed returns. Besides, better risk-adjusted performance from the smoothed re-
turns may help to attract capital flows. Therefore, a natural question would be: do
the hedge fund managers really earn more fees from more return smoothing? In this
section, we will try to answer this question by calculating the dollar incentive fees for
subgroups based on unconditional and conditional return smoothing.
The estimation of dollar incentive fees are reported in Panel A and Panel B of
Table 2.12, for subgroups based on unconditional and conditional serial correlation,
respectively. The dollar incentive fees are estimated using the algorithm of Feng et al.
(2010) as given in the Appendix.
In Panel A, Dedicated Short Bias, Event Driven, Long/Short Equity Hedge and
Multi-Strategy have significantly higher dollar incentive fees for the low θ0 group,
which is the group with more unconditional serial correlation. As these categories
contain nearly 70% of the funds in our sample, the whole sample also exhibit the
same result that funds with higher return smoothing are paid significantly higher
incentive fees than other funds. This finding is consistent with Aragon (2007) in that
successful funds could earn liquidity premium through investment of illiquid assets.
In Panel B of Table 2.12, we find mixed results for the difference of incentive
fees between groups with or without significant conditional serial correlation. Funds
featuring conditional serial correlation earn less dollar incentive fee on average for
both models. However, the median dollar incentive fee is higher for funds featuring
conditional serial correlation in both models.
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The contradiction in mean and median results may be explained by the perfor-
mance distribution of funds featuring conditional serial correlation. In unreporeted
results, we find that funds with conditional return smoothing earn a lower return on
average, and are more negatively skewed and leptokurtic than the rest of the sample.
This implies that there is a lot more tail risk in the returns of funds with conditional
return smoothing. As a result, although funds with conditional return smoothing may
have a higher chance of earning more returns, they may experience massive capital
outflows as well. Therefore, on average, the incentive fees earned by funds exhibit-
ing conditional return smoothing are less than those of other funds. Our results are
consistent with the previous studies of liquidity premium, and also caution the risks
embedded in the funds manipulating returns for better compensation.
In summary, we find managers of more illiquid funds tend to earn more incentive
fees, but funds featuring conditional return smoothing get lower incentive fees on
average.
2.5.7 Return Smoothing and Hedge Fund Failures
Major hedge fund databases such as TASS and CISDM include both live and
graveyard (dead) hedge funds. However, as hedge funds report to these databases
on a voluntary basis, they are free to withdraw from the database for any reason.11
Liang and Park (2010) find that simple criteria such as performance and change in
fund size work better than the stated drop reasons to sort out those discretionarily
liquidated funds as well as live funds from the graveyard. The criteria for the “real
failure” of hedge funds suggested by Liang and Park (2010) include: i) once listed in
11Getmansky et al. (2004b) use the drop reason codes provided by TASS and indicate that liqui-
dation is not the only reason why hedge funds drop out of the live fund database. Other reasons
include stop reporting, unable to contact, closed to new investment, merged into another fund, and
dormant funds. Feffer and Kundro (2003) argue that hedge fund failure should be distinguished
from discretionary fund liquidation, which is much more frequent and is driven by the market ex-
pectations of fund managers. They define failed hedge funds as those that have been forced to cease
investment operations for reasons outside managements control.
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a database but stopped reporting, ii) negative average rate of return for the last 6
months, and iii) decreased AUM for the last 12 months. In this section, we examine
the unconditional and conditional return smoothing for the failed hedge funds, which
is defined by the criteria used in Liang and Park (2010).
The results of unconditional and conditional serial correlation of the subsample
of “real failure” hedge funds as defined above are reported in Table 2.13 and Table
2.14, respectively.
Compared with Table 2.4, eight of the ten categories in Table 2.13 have lower
smoothing coefficient θ0, with the exceptions being Global Macro and Options strat-
egy, which both have only a few failed funds in the sample. The result implies that
the failed hedge funds tend to exhibit more illiquidity and smoothed returns. The
comparison between the failure sample with other funds also shows that the smooth-
ing coefficient θ0, as well as the smoothing index ξ are significantly lower for the failed
funds, which implies more illiquidity and return smoothing in the failed hedge funds.
As shown in Table 2.14, the percentage of funds featuring significant conditional
serial correlation detected using Credit Suissee/Tremont indices and the ABS factor
model are 6.90% and 85.91%, respectively. These numbers are both higher than the
corresponding results, 5.32% and 4.07%, respectively for the whole sample, and 4.25%
and 3.64%, respectively for the graveyard sample. It implies that the failed hedge
funds tend to have more conditional return smoothing.
These results are interesting. In Table 2.4 and Table 2.9, we find that graveyard
funds tend to have less illiquidity and return smoothing in general. However, the
subgroup of “real failure” hedge funds exhibit more illiquidity and return smoothing
under the measures of both conditional and unconditional serial correlation. This may
be explained the other side of the liquidity premium story of Aragon (2007). While
successful funds could manage the illiquidity assets and earn liquidity premium on
them, failing to do so may result in hedge fund failures. The higher percentage of
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conditional return smoothing in these funds also suggest a careful examination of
misreport or misrepresentation of fund returns on these failed funds.
2.6 Conclusion
Recent literature documents that hedge funds have high serial correlation in their
returns. It also suggests that the conditional serial correlation could be used as a first
screen for manipulation of fund returns and hedge fund fraud. We use gross returns
and managerial incentive measures, estimated from a comprehensive algorithm, to
study the return smoothing properties of both regular and failed hedge funds, and
document several interesting findings.
First, we find levels of illiquidity and return smoothing are significantly underes-
timated using net returns, especially for the graveyard funds. Therefore, using gross
returns to estimate return smoothing is both more appropriate and more accurate.
We also estimate both the standard and the smoothing-adjusted Sharpe ratios us-
ing gross returns, and find that they are significantly higher than those using net
returns. This suggests the necessity of a separate calculation of Sharpe ratios for the
gross-of-fee risk-adjusted performance.
Second, we find that funds with greater managerial incentives tend to have more
illiquidity and return smoothing. Higher managerial incentives are also related to
conditional return smoothing, which is a leading indicator of fraud. Furthermore, we
find managers of more illiquid funds tend to earn more incentive fees. However, funds
featuring conditional return smoothing on average earn less fees.
Finally, we study the return smoothing properties of “real failure” hedge funds,
where the failure of hedge funds is defined not only by their status as graveyard funds,
but also using performance measures to distinguish them from liquidated funds in the
graveyard funds. We find that graveyard funds tend to have less illiquidity and return
smoothing in general. However, the subgroup of “real failure” hedge funds exhibit
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more illiquidity and return smoothing under the measures of both conditional and
unconditional serial correlation. While successful funds could manage the illiquidity
assets and earn liquidity premium on them, failing to do so may result in hedge fund
failures. The higher percentage of conditional return smoothing in these funds also
suggest a careful examination of misreport or misrepresentation of fund returns on
these failed funds.
Overall, our findings suggest that managers with greater incentives tend to exhibit
more illiquidity and smoothed returns. They may earn more incentive fees from liq-
uidity premiums and attract more investment with better risk-adjusted performance,
but may not necessarily earn more fees by manipulating returns. The significant dif-
ference between the return smoothing properties of failed funds and non-failed funds
also suggests the possibility of using return smoothing models to forecast hedge fund
failures.
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Table 2.1. Number of Funds in the TASS Hedge Fund Live and Graveyard Databases
In this table we report the number of hedge funds in TASS database having at least
five years of return history in our sample, from January 1994 to April 2010.
Category
Number of funds
Combined Live Graveyard
Convertible Arbitrage (CA) 52 15 37
Dedicated Short Bias (DSB) 9 1 8
Emerging Markets (EM) 109 68 41
Equity Market Neutral (EMN) 60 26 34
Event Driven (ED) 145 68 77
Fixed Income Arbitrage (FIA) 55 22 33
Global Macro (GM) 54 29 25
Long/Short Equity Hedge (LSEH) 466 261 205
Multi-Strategy (MS) 78 45 33
Options Strategy (OS) 5 4 1
All 1033 539 494
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Table 2.4. Unconditional Smoothing Profile and Smoothing Index
This table reports the means and standard deviations of the maximum likelihood
estimates of the unconditional smoothing profile and smoothing index introduced
in Getmansky et al. (2004b), for hedge funds in the TASS combined database with
at least five years of returns history during the period from January 1994 to April
2010. The smoothing profile is estimated using MA(2) smoothing process R0t =
θ0Rt + θ1Rt−1 + θ2Rt−2, and the smoothing index is defined as ξ = θ20 + θ
2
1 + θ
2
2.
MA(2) is estimated under the identification constraint θ0 + θ1 + θ2 = 1. All estimates
are calculated using gross return (GR) and net return (NR) respectively, and the
difference between the estimates of smoothing profile and smoothing index using GR
and NR (diff) are reported, with ***, ** and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels.
Category N
θ0 θ1 θ2 ξ
Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev
Convertible Arbitrage
GR 52 0.644 0.191 0.249 0.180 0.107 0.114 0.568 0.361
NR 52 0.648 0.208 0.248 0.198 0.104 0.123 0.588 0.432
diff -0.005 0.001 0.003 -0.020 *
Dedicated Short Bias
GR 9 0.869 0.068 0.143 0.071 -0.012 0.081 0.790 0.102
NR 9 0.864 0.063 0.135 0.068 0.001 0.075 0.777 0.095
diff 0.005 0.007 ** -0.013 ** 0.013
Emerging Markets
GR 109 0.773 0.146 0.149 0.103 0.079 0.088 0.665 0.244
NR 109 0.770 0.153 0.151 0.106 0.079 0.092 0.665 0.264
diff 0.002 * -0.002 ** 0.000 0.000
Equity Market Neutral
GR 58 0.913 0.306 0.056 0.224 0.032 0.189 1.014 0.899
NR 58 0.927 0.320 0.045 0.241 0.028 0.189 1.055 0.990
diff -0.014 *** 0.010 ** 0.004 -0.042 *
Event Driven
GR 145 0.754 0.150 0.185 0.113 0.061 0.104 0.653 0.231
NR 144 0.755 0.156 0.185 0.117 0.060 0.108 0.657 0.239
diff -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.005 **
Fixed Income Arbitrage
GR 54 0.827 0.335 0.124 0.291 0.049 0.163 0.921 0.992
NR 53 0.843 0.376 0.115 0.327 0.042 0.169 0.996 1.324
diff -0.015 0.008 0.007 -0.075
Global Macro
GR 53 0.973 0.217 0.056 0.151 -0.029 0.138 1.039 0.538
NR 53 0.975 0.225 0.055 0.155 -0.031 0.140 1.048 0.565
diff -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.009
Long/Short Equity Hedge
GR 462 0.893 0.277 0.100 0.162 0.007 0.180 0.943 1.181
NR 462 0.901 0.304 0.098 0.175 0.001 0.195 0.982 1.468
diff -0.008 *** 0.002 0.006 *** -0.040 ***
Multi-Strategy
GR 76 0.804 0.168 0.166 0.101 0.030 0.123 0.728 0.290
NR 78 0.817 0.202 0.160 0.107 0.023 0.146 0.766 0.424
diff -0.012 0.006 * 0.007 -0.038
Options Strategy
GR 5 0.785 0.118 0.174 0.094 0.041 0.084 0.672 0.143
NR 5 0.800 0.130 0.176 0.100 0.024 0.077 0.698 0.154
diff -0.015 -0.003 0.018 * -0.026 *
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Table 2.5. Smoothing-Adjusted Sharpe Ratios
This table compares the mean and standard deviation of the standard Sharpe ratio
with the smoothing-adjusted annualized Sharpe ratios in Lo (2002), for hedge funds
in the TASS combined database with at least five years of returns history during the
period from January 1994 to April 2010. All estimates are calculated using gross
return (GR) and net return (NR) respectively. The difference between two Sharpe
ratio measures is reported as SR− SR∗, with ***, ** and * denoting significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
Category N SR SR
∗
SR− SR∗
Mean StdDev Mean StdDev
Convertible Arbitrage 52
GR 1.67 2.94 1.02 1.39 0.65 ***
NR 1.41 2.94 0.85 1.34 0.56 **
diff 0.26 *** 0.18 ***
Dedicated Short Bias 9
GR 0.35 0.37 0.31 0.33 0.04 *
NR 0.18 0.33 0.17 0.29 0.01
diff 0.16 *** 0.13 ***
Emerging Markets 109
GR 0.94 0.73 0.76 0.66 0.17 ***
NR 0.76 0.69 0.63 0.64 0.13 ***
diff 0.18 *** 0.14 ***
Equity Market Neutral 60
GR 1.45 1.52 1.20 0.80 0.25 *
NR 1.17 1.29 0.99 0.73 0.18
diff 0.28 *** 0.21 ***
Event Driven 145
GR 1.76 1.18 1.31 0.89 0.46 ***
NR 1.47 1.11 1.10 0.83 0.37 ***
diff 0.29 *** 0.20 ***
Fixed Income Arbitrage 55
GR 2.90 8.63 1.96 5.35 0.93 *
NR 2.49 7.96 1.65 4.75 0.83
diff 0.41 *** 0.31 ***
Global Macro 54
GR 1.08 0.47 1.08 0.55 0.00
NR 0.90 0.46 0.91 0.53 -0.01
diff 0.18 *** 0.17 ***
Long/Short Equity Hedge 466
GR 0.93 0.50 0.86 0.49 0.07 ***
NR 0.75 0.47 0.71 0.46 0.04 ***
diff 0.18 *** 0.15 ***
Multi-Strategy 78
GR 1.27 0.79 1.02 0.55 0.25 ***
NR 1.01 0.74 0.82 0.51 0.20 ***
diff 0.25 *** 0.20 ***
Options Strategy 5
GR 1.14 0.62 1.15 0.93 -0.02
NR 0.87 0.51 0.92 0.78 -0.04
diff 0.26 *** 0.24 **
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Table 2.6. Unconditional Return Smoothing for Subsamples
This table reports the mean and standard deviation of smoothing profile and
smoothing index estimated using MA(2) model in Getmansky et al. (2004b) for
subsamples of hedge funds. Other variables are defined in Table 2.3, and the high
(low) groups consist of funds whose characteristic is greater than or equal to (less
than) the median value in the same category. The differences of average return
smoothing profiles and smoothing indices for high and low subsamples are reported,
with ***, ** and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Subsample
θ0 θ1 θ2 ξ
Mean diff Mean diff Mean diff Mean diff
High Total Delta 0.81 0.15 0.04 0.79
Low Total Delta 0.87 -0.07 *** 0.11 0.04 *** 0.02 0.03 *** 0.89 -0.11 *
High Mgr Opt Delta 0.81 0.15 0.04 0.80
Low Mgr Opt Delta 0.87 -0.06 *** 0.11 0.04 *** 0.02 0.02 ** 0.88 -0.08
High Mgr Ownership 0.84 0.13 0.03 0.84
Low Mgr Ownership 0.84 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.85 -0.01
High $ Management Fee 0.82 0.15 0.04 0.80
Low $ Management Fee 0.87 -0.05 *** 0.11 0.04 *** 0.02 0.02 0.89 -0.09
High Volatility 0.89 0.11 0.00 0.93
Low Volatility 0.80 0.09 *** 0.14 -0.03 *** 0.06 -0.06 *** 0.75 0.18 ***
High Flow (%) 0.84 0.13 0.03 0.85
Low Flow (%) 0.85 -0.01 0.13 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.83 0.03 *
High Flow Volatility 0.85 0.12 0.03 0.90
Low Flow Volatility 0.83 0.02 0.13 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.79 0.11
Short Lockup 0.84 0.13 0.04 0.80
Long Lockup 0.85 -0.02 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.93 -0.13 *
Short Redemption Period 0.87 0.11 0.02 0.90
Long Redemption Period 0.81 0.06 *** 0.15 -0.04 *** 0.04 -0.01 0.78 0.11 **
Young 0.85 0.12 0.03 0.89
Senior 0.83 0.02 0.13 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.80 0.09
Large Size 0.81 0.15 0.04 0.79
Small Size 0.87 -0.06 *** 0.11 0.04 *** 0.02 0.02 * 0.89 -0.10 *
Graveyard 0.86 0.11 0.03 0.89
Live 0.83 0.04 ** 0.14 -0.03 ** 0.04 -0.01 0.80 0.09 *
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Table 2.8. Unconditional Smoothing: Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis
This table reports the results of cross-sectional regression with smoothing profile
θ0, or smoothing index ξ as the dependent variable. The smoothing profile and
smoothing index are estimated using the MA(2) model of returns as in Getmansky
et al. (2004b). Independent variables are log(delta), the natural logarithm of the
fund’s total delta, µGR, the average gross returns of each fund, log(σGR), the natural
logarithm of the volatility of gross returns estimated over the calendar year, µflow,
the monthly mean investor cash flow as a percentage of fund assets, log(σflow), the
natural logarithm of the volatility of investor cash flows as a percentage of fund
assets, log(Redemp), the natural logarithm of redemption period in month, Age, the
age of funds in months, and Live, an indicator variable that equals one if the fund
is live as of April 2010. Dummy variables of broad strategies are defined following
Agarwal et al. (2009b). ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent Variable
log(θ0) log(θ0) log(ξ)
Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value
Intercept 0.0005 0.9935 0.2522 *** 0.0008 0.4211 *** 0.0015
log(delta) -0.0181 *** 0.0003 -0.0143 *** 0.0059 -0.0236 ** 0.0100
µGR 1.0564 0.4379 1.4391 0.5503
log(σGR) 0.0745 *** 0.0000 0.1152 *** 0.0000
µflow -0.0196 0.6884 -0.0320 0.7106
log(σflow) 0.0089 0.4086 0.0080 0.6731
log(Redemp) -0.0471 *** 8E-06 -0.0458 *** 0.0000 -0.0692 *** 0.0002
Age 0.0002 0.3129 0.0002 0.3096 0.0001 0.8030
Live -0.0387 ** 0.0121 -0.0439 *** 0.0039 -0.0833 *** 0.0020
Strategy Dummies No Yes Yes
R2 0.1056 0.1425 0.1107
Adj-R2 0.0992 0.1328 0.1006
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Table 2.9. Frequency of Conditional Serial Correlation
This table reports the number and percentage of funds with significant positive and
significant negative coefficients evaluated at the two-sided 5% level for each category
of hedge funds. The regression model for conditional serial correlation follows Bollen
and Pool (2008), i.e. ROt = a + b
+
1 R
O
t−1 + b
−
1 (1 − It−1)ROt−1 + ηt , where ROt is the
observed gross return in month t and It−1 equals one if the fund’s systematic return
from an optimal factor model at month t-1 is greater than the mean systematic
return. Listed are results when Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund indices, as well
as the asset-based style (ABS) factors developed by Fung and Hsieh (2004) are used
as available factors in determining It−1.
Category
Credit Suisse/Tremont Indices ABS Factors
N Pos Neg Pos Neg Pos Neg Pos Neg
Convertible Arbitrage 52 38 0 4 5 39 1 5 3
Dedicated Short Bias 9 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Emerging Markets 109 27 0 4 2 37 1 3 2
Equity Market Neutral 60 16 0 3 10 15 2 3 10
Event Driven 145 75 1 4 9 83 1 4 17
Fixed Income Arbitrage 55 21 3 4 7 22 2 2 8
Global Macro 54 4 1 3 2 3 1 3 2
Long/Short Equity Hedge 466 90 2 24 19 97 5 19 24
Multi-Strategy 78 25 0 7 3 32 0 3 4
Options Strategy 5 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Live 539 142 2 34 23 171 6 24 31
(% Rejections) 26.35% 0.37% 6.31% 4.27% 31.73% 1.11% 4.45% 5.75%
Graveyard 494 155 5 21 34 159 7 18 39
(% Rejections) 31.38% 1.01% 4.25% 6.88% 32.19% 1.42% 3.64% 7.89%
Liquidated 179 48 1 9 13 46 0 3 12
(% Rejections) 26.82% 0.56% 5.03% 7.26% 25.70% 0.00% 1.68% 6.70%
All 1033 297 7 55 57 330 13 42 70
(% Rejections) 28.75% 0.68% 5.32% 5.52% 31.95% 1.26% 4.07% 6.78%
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Table 2.10. Conditional Return Smoothing for Subsamples
This table reports the number and percentage of funds having conditional serial cor-
relation, detected by significant positive b1- coefficients evaluated at the two-sided
5% level. The regression model for conditional serial correlation follows Bollen and
Pool (2008), i.e. ROt = a+ b
+
1 R
O
t−1 + b
−
1 (1− It−1)ROt−1 + ηt, where ROt is the observed
gross return in month t and It−1 equals one if the fund’s systematic return from an
optimal factor model at month t-1 is greater than the mean systematic return. Listed
are results when Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund indices, as well as the asset-
based style (ABS) factors developed by Fung and Hsieh (2004) are used as available
factors in determining It−1. Other variables are defined in Table 3, and the high (low)
groups consist of funds whose characteristic is greater than or equal to (less than)
the median value in the same category. The differences of average return smoothing
profiles and smoothing indices for high and low subsamples are reported, with ***,
** and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Subsample
Credit Suisse/Tremont Indices ABS Factors
# % diff # % diff
High Total Delta 30 6.01% 19 3.81%
Low Total Delta 22 4.40% 1.61% 21 4.20% -0.39%
High Mgr Opt Delta 28 5.61% 20 4.01%
Low Mgr Opt Delta 24 4.80% 0.81% 20 4.00% 0.01%
High Mgr Ownership 34 6.59% 26 5.04%
Low Mgr Ownership 21 4.06% 2.53% * 16 3.09% 1.94%
High $ Management Fee 30 5.81% 24 4.65%
Low $ Management Fee 25 4.84% 0.98% 18 3.48% 1.17%
High Volatility 40 7.75% 22 4.26%
Low Volatility 15 2.90% 4.85% *** 20 3.87% 0.40%
High Flow (%) 24 4.65% 24 4.65%
Low Flow (%) 31 6.00% -1.34% 18 3.48% 1.17%
High Flow Volatility 23 4.46% 25 4.84%
Low Flow Volatility 32 6.19% -1.73% 17 3.29% 1.56%
Short Lockup 38 5.58% 29 4.26%
Long Lockup 17 4.83% 0.75% 13 3.69% 0.57%
Short Redemption Period 39 7.68% 20 3.94%
Long Redemption Period 16 3.10% 4.58% *** 22 4.26% -0.33%
Young 30 5.86% 23 4.49%
Senior 25 4.80% 1.06% 19 3.65% 0.85%
Large Size 30 5.81% 21 4.07%
Small Size 25 4.84% 0.98% 21 4.06% 0.01%
Graveyard 21 4.3% 18 3.64%
Live 34 6.3% -2.06% 24 4.45% -0.81%
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Table 2.11. Conditional Serial Correlation: Cross-Sectional Analysis
This table reports the logit regression in which the dependent variable equals one
if a fund features statistically significant conditional serial correlation and zero
otherwise. Conditional serial correlation is detected using the regression: ROt =
a+ b+1 R
O
t−1 + b
−
1 (1− It−1)ROt−1 + ηt, where ROt is the observed gross return in month
t and It−1 equals one if the fund’s systematic return from an optimal factor model
at month t-1 is greater than the mean systematic return. Listed are results when
Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund indices, as well as the asset-based style (ABS)
factors developed by Fung and Hsieh (2004) are used as available factors in deter-
mining It−1. Independent variables are log(delta), the natural logarithm of the fund’s
total delta, µGR, the average gross returns of each fund, log(σGR), the natural log-
arithm of the volatility of gross returns estimated over the calendar year, µflow, the
monthly mean investor cash flow as a percentage of fund assets, log(σFlow), the nat-
ural logarithm of the volatility of investor cash flows as a percentage of fund assets,
log(RedemptionPeriod), the natural logarithm of redemption period in month, Age,
the age of funds in months, and Live, an indicator variable that equals one if the fund
is live as of April 2010. Dummy variables of broad strategies are defined following
Agarwal et al. (2009a). ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels.
Credit Suisse/Tremont Indices FH 7-Factor Model
Coeff p-Value Coeff p-Value
Intercept -0.204 0.8971 -0.0459 0.9791
log(delta) 0.1994 * 0.0541 0.2139 * 0.0683
µGR -55.5121 ** 0.0427 -85.8109 *** 0.0048
log(σGR) 1.1308 *** 0.0002 1.2206 *** 0.0004
µflow -3.6574 0.5727 -3.7305 0.5945
log(σflow) -0.1413 0.6141 0.0387 0.9067
log(RedemptionPeriod) -0.3980 ** 0.0292 0.1449 0.5604
Age -0.0030 0.3908 -0.0076 * 0.0830
Live 0.4014 0.2000 0.4071 0.2499
Strategy Dummies Yes Yes
LR statistic 25.7435 21.8969
p-value (LR stat) 0.0071 0.0252
Adjusted Cox & Snell pseudo-R2 0.0771 0.0776
# obs 984 984
# Reject 51 39
Frequency 5.18% 3.96%
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Table 2.13. Unconditional Serial Correlation of Failed Hedge Funds
This table reports the means and standard deviations of the maximum likelihood
estimates of the unconditional smoothing profile and smoothing index introduced in
Getmansky et al. (2004b), for the subsample of “real failure” hedge funds, where the
criteria for real failure” of hedge funds follow Liang and Park (2010), i.e. all three
of the following criteria are met, i) once listed in graveyard database ii) negative
average rate of return for the last 6 months, and iii) decreased AUM for the last 12
months. The smoothing profile is estimated using MA(2) smoothing process R0t =
θ0Rt+θ1Rt−1 +θ2Rt−2, and the smoothing index is defined as ξ = θ20 +θ
2
1 +θ
2
2. MA(2)
is estimated under the identification constraint θ0 + θ1 + θ2 = 1. Difference of the
smoothing profiles and smoothing index between the failed funds and other funds in
sample are reported, with ***, ** and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels.
Category N
θ0 θ1 θ2 ξ
Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev
Convertible Arbitrage 23 0.614 0.179 0.266 0.118 0.120 0.130 0.523 0.188
Dedicated Short Bias 2 0.864 0.035 0.126 0.156 0.009 0.122 0.783 0.022
Emerging Markets 16 0.787 0.104 0.148 0.073 0.065 0.082 0.667 0.149
Equity Market Neutral 13 0.838 0.208 0.045 0.254 0.117 0.167 0.843 0.398
Event Driven 24 0.734 0.151 0.171 0.121 0.095 0.098 0.622 0.212
Fixed Income Arbitrage 15 0.770 0.195 0.197 0.129 0.033 0.159 0.707 0.331
Global Macro 9 1.056 0.293 -0.060 0.192 0.004 0.141 1.245 0.857
Long/Short Equity Hedge 85 0.854 0.236 0.113 0.117 0.032 0.213 0.857 0.723
Multi-Strategy 11 0.762 0.156 0.172 0.107 0.066 0.113 0.659 0.202
Options Strategy 1 0.873 - 0.204 - -0.077 - 0.810 -
All Failed Funds 199 0.803 0.139 0.139 0.768 0.058 0.147 0.171 0.554
Non-Failed Funds 824 0.852 0.258 0.124 0.171 0.024 0.152 0.860 0.951
Diff -0.048 *** 0.015 0.034 ** -0.689 *
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Table 2.14. Conditional Serial Correlation of Failed Hedge Funds
This table reports the frequency counts of funds with significant positive b1- coeffi-
cients in the conditional smoothing model of Bollen and Pool (2008) for the subsample
of “real failure” hedge funds, where the criteria for “real failure” of hedge funds follow
Liang and Park (2010), i.e. all three of the following criteria are met, i) once listed
in graveyard database ii) negative average rate of return for the last 6 months, and
iii) decreased AUM for the last 12 months. Conditional serial correlation is detected
using the regression: ROt = a + b
+
1 R
O
t−1 + b
−
1 (1 − It−1)ROt−1 + ηt, where ROt is the
observed gross return in month t and It−1 equals one if the fund’s systematic return
from an optimal factor model at month t-1 is greater than the mean systematic re-
turn. Listed are results when Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund indices, as well as
the asset-based style (ABS) factors developed by Fung and Hsieh (2004) are used as
available factors in determining It−1.
Category
# Credit Suisse/Tremont Indices ABS Factors
Funds # Rejections % Rejections # Rejections % Rejections
Convertible Arbitrage 23 4 17.39% 4 17.39%
Dedicated Short Bias 2 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Emerging Markets 16 1 6.25% 0 0.00%
Equity Market Neutral 14 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Event Driven 24 1 4.17% 1 4.17%
Fixed Income Arbitrage 16 1 6.25% 1 6.25%
Global Macro 10 0 0.00% 2 20.00%
Long/Short Equity Hedge 86 6 6.98% 4 4.65%
Multi-Strategy 11 1 9.09% 0 0.00%
Options Strategy 1 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
All Failed Funds 203 14 6.90% 12 5.91%
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CHAPTER 3
A COMPARISON OF HEDGE FUND GROSS AND NET
PERFORMANCE
3.1 Introduction
The incentive contract of hedge funds often feature an annual management fee at
about 2% of assets, and a 20% performance (incentive) fee for performance above high-
water mark and hurdle rate. The existence of such incentive fees and high-watermark
contracts means that hedge fund fees are both time-varying and path-dependent, and
therefore that the relationship between gross and net of fee returns is nonlinear.
Net returns have been used for most of the studies on hedge fund performance
and risks, and gross returns are rarely calculated and used in the literature due to
the availability of data and complexity of algorithm.1 Some recent studies suggest
the necessity of using gross returns for the studies of hedge fund performance and
risks. Feng et al. (2010) and Feng and Getmansky (2011) find that gross returns and
net returns have significantly different distributions as measured by statistics such
as mean, standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis, as well as return smoothing
properties. By modeling gross returns and incentive fees separately in factor models,
Brooks et al. (2007) show that the use of net of fee returns can lead to considerably
biased estimates of factor exposures which can distort the picture of fund manager
performance, due to the non-linear impact of incentive fees.
In this paper, we use the algorithm in Feng et al. (2010) to estimate gross returns,
fees and hedge fund deltas. We explore the difference between the gross-of-fee and net-
1Only net returns, instead of gross returns, are reported in all major hedge fund databases.
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of-fee hedge fund performance, by investigating the difference in distribution, factor
exposures and alphas between gross and net returns. We find that gross returns
are distributed significantly differently from net returns. The gross-of-fee alphas are
higher than the net-of-fee alphas by about 4% annually on average. We also find
positive relation between hedge fund performance and fund size, fund flows, and
managerial incentives, which holds for both gross-of-fee performance and net-of-fee
performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives a review of related
literature. Section 3.3 presents the methodology used in the empirical analysis of
this paper. Section 3.4 describes the data. Section 3.5 presents the empirical results.
Section 3.6 concludes the paper. The algorithm of gross returns and deltas is provided
in the Appendix.
3.2 Related Literature
The standard approach to evaluate fund performance is to regress fund returns
on risk factors that proxy for different trading strategies. Starting Jensen (1968),
linear factor models are widely applied in the studies of fund performance and risks.
For mutual fund performance, the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and
Carhart (1997) four-factor model are typically applied. Compared to mutual funds,
hedge funds often have more flexibility in their investment, and can apply dynamic
trading strategies in various markets. As noted by Fung and Hsieh (1997), hedge
fund returns feature option-like payoffs relative to the returns of underlying assets.
To capture the option-like features of hedge fund dynamic trading, Fung and Hsieh
(2001) develop factors to represent the payoffs of trend-following strategies. Mitchell
and Pulvino (2001) generate a return series to represent a risk arbitrate strategy.
Agarwal and Naik (2004) use options-based returns to provide a flexible functional
form to represent unspecified nonlinear equity strategies.
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The “alpha” of factor models is used as a measure of risk-adjusted performance
of hedge funds. The majority of research conducted on hedge fund performance
finds that hedge funds on average outperform passive benchmarks.2 However, the
findings regarding to the overall trend of hedge fund “alphas” is mixed in the recent
literature. Some recent studies suggest that hedge fund alpha has been decreasing
over time. Fung et al. (2008) find that hedge fund alphas decrease due to capacity
constraints. Zhong (2008) find that on a fund level capital flows have a positive
(negative) impact on a funds future performance for smaller (larger) funds. Hence,
he confirms the findings of Naik et al. (2007) that fund flows at a strategy level increase
the competition within the strategy and exert pressure on the future performance.
Ammann et al. (2011) find no evidence of a decreasing hedge fund alpha over time.
Due to the availability of data and complexity of algorithm, gross returns are
rarely calculated and used in the literature of hedge fund performance. Some recent
studies start to use estimated gross returns in the analysis hedge fund performance,
including Brooks et al. (2007), French (2008), Agarwal et al. (2009b), and Feng et al.
(2010). Brooks et al. (2007) model gross returns and incentive fees separately, and use
the “moneyness” of the call option of incentive fee as a proxy of the delta of incentive
contract. They find that the use of net of fee returns can lead to considerably biased
estimates of factor exposures which can distort the picture of fund manager perfor-
mance, due to the non-linear impact of incentive fees. However, their algorithm is
based on single-investor assumption, and fund flows are ignored in their estimations.
French (2008) also has similar limitations in the algorithm. Agarwal et al. (2009b)
provide a comprehensive annual algorithm of incentive fees, gross returns and man-
agerial incentive measures, which takes into account capital flows, high-water mark
and hurdle rate provisions of individual investors. Feng et al. (2010) is an extension
2See Agarwal and Naik (2000), Fung and Hsieh (2004), Hasanhodzica and Lo (2007), Kosowski
et al. (2007), Amenc et al. (2010), and Titman and Tiu (2011).
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of the algorithm in Agarwal et al. (2009b), which allows monthly estimation, accrual
of incentive fees before they are paid at the end of the year, and modeling both man-
agement fee and incentive fee. We will use the algorithm of Feng et al. (2010) in this
paper.
3.3 Methodology
While an extensive literature has studied hedge fund performance, there is no con-
sensus so far on which factors to include in a factor model for this purpose. As hedge
funds often have flexibilities in their investment, and features option-like non-linear
payoffs, factors that captures the non-linearity and the option-like payoff features are
used.
In this paper, we estimate the alphas of both gross and net returns for individual
hedge funds and hedge fund indices, with two alternative factor models and two
different estimation methodologies. The two factor models investigated include the
Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model, and an alternative model that selects the
risk factors based on stepwise regression. The factor models are estimated based
on a constant-loading OLS approach, and an OLS estimation over rolling 24-month
windows.
In the alternative model, we include both the three Fama and French (1993)
factors, and the seven asset-based style factors of Fung and Hsieh (2004).3 The
Fama-French factors are the excess return of the market, MKTRF , and the returns
of the size and value portfolios, SMB and HML. To allow for time variation and non-
linearity in the exposure of the size and value premia, the squared returns of the size
3These factors are used in many hedge fund performance studies, for example, Bollen and Whaley
(2009).
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and value portfolios, SMBSQ and HMLSQ, are also included.4 The first two Fung
and Hsieh (2004) factors are D10YR, the change in yield of a 10-year Treasury note,
and DSPRD (dubbed the “credit spread”), the yield on 10-year BAA corporate
bonds less the yield of a 10-year Treasury note. The five remaining Fung-Hsieh
variables are trend factors, which are the returns of portfolios of options on bonds,
BD; foreign currencies, FX; commodities, COM ; short-term interest rates, IR; and
stock indexes, STK. To correct for illiquidity, we include both contemporaneous and
two lagged months as independent variables.
The excess returns follow
Ri,t = αi +
2∑
m=0
Xt−mβm,i + εi,t (3.1)
where Ri,t is the excess gross (or net) return of fund (or strategy index) i at time t, and
X is a subset of the following factors, [MKTRF, SMB,HML, SMBSQ,HMLSQ,
D10Y R,DSPRD,PTFSBD,PTFSFX,PTFSCOM,PTFSIR, PTFSSTK]. A de-
scription of these factors is provided in Table A.1.
Due to limits of degrees of freedom in estimating the model, we attempt to keep
the number of factors included in the factor model as low as possible, while still being
able to describe the investment opportunities available to hedge funds. Following
Agarwal and Naik (2004), Titman and Tiu (2011), and Ammann et al. (2011), we use
stepwise regressions for the selection of risk factors to be included in our alternative
factor models. For the selection procedure we start with 36 risk factors, including
the contemporaneous and first two lags of factors give in X of equation (3.1). For
each fund or strategy index, we regress excess gross (or net) returns on the returns of
these factors. The stepwise regression approach is based on the Bayesian Information
4We follow the Treynor and Mazuy (1966) quadratic regression. We do not add a squared market
term since the trend-following factor already captures dynamic exposure to the market.
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Criterion (BIC) over the entire sample period with constant coefficients. We employ
the identical risk factors for each fund or strategy index over the entire sample period.
The summary of statistics and correlation matrix of the factors used in our analy-
sis are given in Table 4. There are a few high correlations between these factors. For
example, the correlation between the Fama-French size factor squared SMBSQ, and
the Fama-French value factor squared HMLSQ, is 0.513, the correlation between
the change in the 10-year treasury yield D10Y R, and the change in the spread be-
tween BAA yield and 10-year treasury yield DSPRD, is -0.517. As our procedure
for selecting factors is based soly on overall explanatory power, it is unaffected by
multicollinearity.
3.4 Data
We use the hedge fund data from Lipper TASS database. TASS has monthly
net-of-fee returns, assets under management, and other fund characteristics, such as
hurdle rates and high-water mark provisions, lockup, notice, and redemption periods,
incentive fees, management fees, inception dates, and fund strategies. TASS also
classifies hedge funds into 12 strategies: Convertible Arbitrage, Dedicated Short Bias,
Emerging Markets, Equity Market Neutral, Event Driven, Fixed Income Arbitrage,
Global Macro, Long/Short Equity Hedge, Managed Futures, Multi-Strategy, Fund
of Funds, and Options Strategy. TASS reports two separate databases, one with
“live” funds and another with “graveyard” funds, which keeps track of funds that
stop reporting and starts in 1994. Our sample period extends from January 1994 to
April 2010. We include both live and graveyard databases and focus on the post-1994
period to mitigate the potential survival-ship bias. As of April 2010, there are 14,177
hedge funds, out of which 5,989 are operational, while 8,188 became defunct during
our sample period.
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We exclude funds that i) report gross returns, ii) have missing information on
management fee or incentive fee,5 iii) do not report continuously and monthly, and
iv) are in the categories of funds of funds, or managed futures, or “other” hedge funds,
or have missing strategy information.6 We delete observations that are backfilled to
eliminate backfill bias.7
There are additional steps we take to obtain a continuous track of the assets
under management (thereafter, AUM ) and net asset value (thereafter, NAV ) for the
algorithm of gross returns and managerial incentives. We delete observations with
missing or stale AUM at the beginning or the end of the fund performance history.8
We also interpolate the missing or stale AUM for up to 3 months, and then keep the
longest continuous interval of each fund. As we estimate alpha based on rolling 24-
month window regeressions, we require at least 24 non-backfilled return observations
for a fund to be included in our analysis.
After these data cleaning steps, we have 2,956 funds in our sample, out of which
1,306 are live funds and 1,650 are graveyard funds. The number of funds in each
category of live and graveyard databases is given in Table 3.1.
We also construct equally-weighted and value-weighted strategy index for each
category of funds included in our sample. For funds to be included in the equally-
weighted strategy index, we additionally require their assets under management to
exceed USD 5 million at least once during their non-backfilled observations. After
all these adjustments, we are left with a sample of 2816 hedge funds for all analyses
5If both rates are reported zero, then the fund is also eliminated from the sample.
6We exclude funds of funds since it has different fee structure from other fund strategies, see
Brown et al. (2004). We exclude managed futures and “other” hedge funds since these categories
are not usually considered “typical” hedge funds.
7The observation is defined as backfilled if the performance date is before “DateAddedToTass”
8Asset Under Management is defined as missing if it is not reported or reported as zero; it is
defined as stale if it is equal to its value of previous month.
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conducted on the equally weighted index and 2956 funds for all analyses conducted on
the value-weighted index, where the 5 million assets under management requirement
is not imposed.
AUM9 and NAV are converted to US dollar, if the original currency is not US
dollar. The monthly exchange rates and the three-month London Interbank Offered
Rate (LIBOR) of US dollar are downloaded from Bloomberg. The data of trend
following factors of Fung and Hsieh (2001) are downloaded from David A. Hsieh’s
website,10 and the other factors used in Fung and Hsieh (2001) are downloaded from
Kenneth French’s website. 11
3.5 Empirical Results
3.5.1 Return Distribution Comparison
In this section, we compare the performance distribution using gross returns with
those using net returns. The gross returns are estimated with the algorithm of Feng
et al. (2010).12
Table 3.3 summarizes the descriptive statistics of gross returns and net returns, for
all funds and each category from January 1994 through April 2010. We compare the
mean, median, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, autocorrelation, Sharpe ratios,
and Jarque-Bera normality test between gross returns and net returns. We find that
the differences of all these statistics between gross and net returns are significant at
the 1% level for funds in both live and graveyard fund database.
9“EstimatedAssets” in TASS
10http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/DataLibrary/TF-FAC.xls
11http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/f-f_
factors.html
12The details of the algorithm are provided in the Appendix.
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As shown in Table 3.3, for all of the ten hedge fund styles, gross returns and
net returns are significantly different at significance level of 1% for both mean and
median. The difference in the mean monthly return between gross and net returns
ranges from 0.252% (amount to 3.07% annually, for Equity Market Neutral) to 0.410%
(amount to 5.03% annually, for Emerging Markets). We also find that the mean and
median returns of live funds are higher than those of the graveyard funds, indicating
that live funds have better overall performance compared to the graveyard funds.
For all hedge fund styles, we find that the standard deviations of gross returns are
significantly higher (at 1% level) than those of net returns. As the magnitude in the
difference in mean returns dominates that of the standard deviation of returns, both
measures of Sharpe ratios show significantly higher values for gross returns compared
to net returns.13
Consistent with the findings in hedge fund literature, Table 3.3 also shows sig-
nificant deviation from normal distribution for both gross and net returns. Both
measures of returns feature negative skewness and high kurtosis, with over half of
the funds rejecting the Jarque-Bera normality test. When comparing gross returns
with net returns, we find gross returns are less negatively skewed, less leptokurtic,
and less likely to reject the normality test. Therefore, gross returns are slightly more
“normal-like” than net returns. This may be explained by the asymmetric fee struc-
ture of hedge funds, which increases the non-normality of the net return distribution.
Finally, we estimate and compare the first order serial correlation of gross returns
and net returns. Consistent with the Feng and Getmansky (2011), we find that live
funds have higher serial correlation compared to graveyard funds. Only graveyard
funds have significantly higher serial correlation in gross returns than in net returns.
We also estimate both the standard and smoothing adjusted Sharpe ratios of both
13We estimate both the standard Sharpe ratio and the smoothing-adjusted Sharpe ratio following
Lo (2002).
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gross returns and net returns, and find that for all fund styles, gross returns are
significantly higher in both measures of Sharpe ratios than net returns. The average
difference in smoothing-adjusted Sharpe ratio between the two return measures is
0.210, which is about 25% of the Sharpe ratio of net returns.
In summary, the gross returns and net returns of hedge funds have significantly
different distributions as measured by all the statistics reported. Therefore, it is im-
portant to study the gross-of-fee and net-of-fee performance of hedge funds separately.
3.5.2 Factor Exposure
In Table 3.5, we report the summary of factor exposures for both the Fung and
Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model, and the alternative factor model based on stepwise
regression, using both gross returns and net returns. We apply these models on both
individual funds, as well as the equally-weighted and value-weighted strategy indices.
As reported in Panel A of Table 3.5, only MKTRF , DSPRD and PTFSFX
have significant average exposures for both individual funds and two indices. the risk
exposure to SMB is only significant for estimates of the two indices, and the exposure
to PTFSCOM is only significant for individual funds. These results imply that both
gross-of-fee and net-of-fee hedge fund performance have significant exposure to the
market risk, credit spread, and the trend-following strategy on foreign currency and
commodity, as well as the size factor at the strategy level.
Comparing the factor exposures between gross returns and net returns, we find
that gross returns produce significantly higher exposures to four of the seven factors,
which are MKTRF , SMB, PTFSBD, and PTFSCOM .14
We also summarize the factor exposures estimated from the alternative model
based on stepwise regression. As reported in Panel B of Table 3.5, the average number
14The exposure to Primitive trend follower strategy bond, PTFSBD, is negative for both gross
return and net return. The exposure estimated using gross returns is larger in magnitude.
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of factors are 14 among individual hedge funds (for both gross and net returns), 11 for
equally-weighted index (for both gross and net returns), and 8 (9) for value-weighted
index using gross (net) returns, respectively. We also find that 73.1% (73.5%) of funds
have exposure to the market risk using gross (net) returns. About 40% of funds also
have exposure to the lag value of market risk factor. The other factors with more
than 40% of funds having exposure to include the size and book-to-market factors,
the term and credit spreads, and the trend-following strategies of short-term interest
rate and stock. The percentage of funds with other factor exposures range between
35% to 40%. The average factor exposures of gross returns and net returns are also
different. The difference is present in the exposure to both contemporaneous and lag
values of these values of factors, which implies that the non-linear exposures to these
factors are also different between gross and net returns.
In summary, the factor exposures are significantly different for 5 out of 7 factors
in the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model, and also different for both contemporaneous
and lagged values of factors in the alternative model based on stepwise regression.
These results is consistent with the findings of Brooks et al. (2007) in that the factor
exposures of gross-of-fee and net-of-fee hedge fund performance are different. The
use of net returns can lead to considerably biased estimates of factor exposures which
can distort the picture of fund manager performance, due to the non-linear impact of
incentive fees.
3.5.3 Alphas of Gross-of-fee and Net-of-fee Performance
In this section, we explore the risk-adjusted gross-of-fee and net-of-fee hedge fund
performance as measured by the “alphas” of individual funds and strategy indices
estimated from the two models that we use.
Table 3.6 reports the average alphas of individual hedge funds within each strategy,
live and dead databases, and the whole sample. Using Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-
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factor model, we find the alphas are significantly positive for all strategies, both
live and dead databases, and the whole sample. This holds for both gross returns
and net returns. This is also consistent with the hedge fund literature that hedge
funds have positive risk-adjusted performance. We also find that the live funds have
higher alphas than graveyard funds for both gross returns and net returns across all
models. The percentage of funds with positive alphas are higher for live funds than
for graveyard funds across all models.
Furthermore, we find that gross returns generate significantly higher alphas com-
pared to net returns. On average, gross returns have significantly higher alphas than
net returns, for almost all the hedge fund strategies in all models. This difference
ranges from 3.36% to 4.2% per year across models and estimation methods. This
difference is also higher for the live fund sample, compared to the graveyard sample,
which can be explained by the better compensation to live funds than the graveyard
funds. Using gross returns, we also find much higher percentage of funds with positive
alphas in our models. For example, using Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model
with constant loadings, we find 41% of funds have positive alphas using gross returns,
while only 28% of funds have positive alphs using net returns. The difference in this
percentage is around 10% using other models.
Finally, we compare the alphas of gross and net returns using equally-weighted
indices of hedge fund strategies. As reported in Table 3.7, the results are similar
to what we find for individual funds. The alphas of gross returns and net returns
are both significantly positive for almost all strategies and models, and gross returns
are higher in alphas than net returns by 3.84% to 5.76% annually, depending on the
model that we use.
In summary, we find that on average, the gross-of-fee alpha is higher than the
net-of-fee alpha by about 4% annually, and the percentage of funds with significantly
positive gross-of-fee alpha is higher than the precentage of funds with significantly
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positive net-of-fee alpha by about 10%. Our findings suggest that the gross-of-fee
hedge fund performance is significantly better than the net-of-fee hedge fund perfor-
mance.
3.5.4 More on the Hypotheses about Hedge Fund Alphas
In this section, we investigate several hypotheses regarding hedge fund perfor-
mance that have been tested in literature, using both gross returns and net returns.
We are interested in whether there is a decrease of alpha over time, whether there is
capacity constraint for hedge fund performance, and the relation between hedge fund
performance and managerial incentives. The description and summary statistics of
fund characteristics, such as AUM and fund flows, and the managerial incentives are
reported in Table 3.2.
3.5.4.1 Is Alpha Decreasing Over Time?
We estimate time series of alphas for both gross returns and net returns using
rolling-window regression. The result from Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model
is plotted in Figure 1. We find that alpha of hedge funds are positive almost all
the time, for both gross-of-fee performance and net-of-fee performance. There is no
evidence that hedge fund alpha is decreasing over time.
3.5.4.2 Is there Capacity Constraint in Hedge Fund Performance?
We investigate whether capacity constraint holds for gross-of-fee and net-of-fee
performance of hedge funds, by examining the average alphas in quintiles of fund size
and fund flows.
As reported in Panel A of Table 3.8, the difference between alphas of the top and
bottom quintiles of fund size is significantly positive, using both gross returns and
net returns. Similar result holds for flow quintiles. These results imply that larger
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fund size and fund flows are associated with better performance, and do not support
that there is capacity constraint for hedge funds performance in our sample.
3.5.4.3 Relation Between Hedge Fund Performance and Managerial In-
centives
We examine the relation between hedge fund performance and managerial incen-
tives using two incentive measures, which are the total delta as introduced by Agarwal
et al. (2009b) and the indicator of high-water mark provision.15
As reported in Table 3.8, we find that the funds with higher delta or high-water
mark provision tend to perform better, which holds for both gross returns and net
returns. This result implies that hedge funds with higher managerial incentives tend
to have better gross-of-fee and net-of-fee risk-adjusted performance.
3.6 Conclusion
Previous literature suggests that the factor exposures may be biased when esti-
mated using net returns, due to the non-linear incentive structure of hedge funds. In
this paper, we explore whether and how the risk-adjusted hedge fund performance is
different using gross-of-fee and net-of-fee measures. We employ both Fung and Hsieh
(2004) seven-factor model and an alternative factor model based on stepwise regres-
sion, and use both constant-loading regression and rolling-window regression for this
purpose. We document several interesting findings:
First, the gross return distribution is significantly different from that of the net
returns. This holds for statistics like mean, median, standard deviation, skewness
and kurtosis, as well as return smoothing properties. We also find that gross returns
are more “normal-like” compared to net returns, due to the asymmetric fee structure
which adds non-normality to the net return distribution.
15See the definition and algorithm of total delta in the Appendix.
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Second, the risk-adjusted performance is different between gross-of-fee and net-
of-fee measures. Both standard and smoothing-adjusted Sharpe ratios are higher for
gross returns than for net returns. The alphas of all factor models are also significantly
higher for gross returns than for net returns, and the average difference in alpha is
about 4% per year.
Finally, we find no evidence of decrease in alpha or capacity constraint in hedge
fund performance for both gross-of-fee and net-of-fee measures. We also find a positive
relation between hedge fund alphas and the managerial incentives, which also holds
for both gross-of-fee and net-of-fee measures.
In summary, the performance distribution of hedge funds is significantly different
before and after applying fees, due to the non-linear fee structure of hedge funds.
The gross-of-fee risk-adjusted performance of hedge funds is much higher than the
net-of-fee measure. Our findings suggest that it is necessary to examine the gross-
of-fee performance of hedge funds separately from the net-of-fee performance, which
may give us a clearer picture of the risk structure and performance of hedge fund
portfolios.
104
Table 3.1. Number of Funds in the TASS Hedge Fund Live and Graveyard Databases
In this table we report the number of hedge funds in TASS database having at least
24 months of continuous, non-backfilled return history in our sample, from January
1994 to April 2010.
Strategy Code
Number of Funds
Combined Live Graveyard
Convertible Arbitrage CA 139 35 104
Dedicated Short Bias DSB 22 7 15
Emerging Markets EM 324 213 111
Equity Market Neutral EMN 244 74 170
Event Driven ED 345 119 226
Fixed Income Arbitrage FIA 141 43 98
Global Macro GM 182 75 107
Long/Short Equity Hedge LSEH 1330 604 726
Multi-Strategy MS 216 124 92
Options Strategy OS 13 12 1
All 2956 1306 1650
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Table 3.2. Statistics of Fund Characteristics, Flow, and Managerial Incentives
This table reports summary statistics of fund characteristics, capital flows and man-
agerial incentives for funds in our sample from January 1994 to April 2010. Panel
A show statistics for all funds, and panel B show statistics for each category. Total
Delta is the total expected dollar change in the manager’s wealth for a 1% change in
NAV. Mgr’s Opt Delta is the delta from incentive contracts. Mgr Ownership is the
percentage of manager’s investment in the fund to the total asset under management.
Flow is the annual capital flow scaled by the previous end-of-year AUM, reported in
percentage. $MF and $IF are the annual dollar amount of management fee and the
annual dollar amount of incentive fees respectively, reported in million US dollars.
LockUpPeriod is lockup period in years based on funds that have nonzero lockup
period. RedemptionPeriod is the sum of RedemptionNoticePeriod and Redemption-
Frequency, reported in years. Age is age of funds in years. AUM is the monthly
average of fund asset under management, given as millions of US dollars. MF (%)
and IF (%) the percentage rates of management fee and incentive fee respectively. In
Panel B, all variables are reported in mean.
Panel A: All Funds
Variable N Mean StdDev Min Median Max
Age (year) 2956 7.28 4.02 2.08 6.17 32.42
AUM ($ million) 2956 153.16 341.58 0.02 49.60 5981.84
MF (%) 2956 1.40 0.49 0.00 1.50 6.00
IF (%) 2956 18.88 4.47 0.00 20.00 50.00
LockUpPeriod (year) 958 1.05 0.57 0.08 1.00 7.50
RedemptionPeriod (year) 2956 0.31 0.24 0.00 0.25 1.50
Flow (Ann. %) 2596 216.39 477.22 -19.12 49.65 789.46
$MF ($ million) 2596 1.72 1.15 0.40 1.61 3.28
$IF ($ million) 2596 2.79 2.94 0.35 2.02 7.19
Total Delta ($ million) 2868 0.28 0.17 0.10 0.25 0.52
Mgr’s Opt Delta ($ million) 2868 0.18 0.11 0.06 0.16 0.33
Mgr Ownership (%) 2868 5.80 5.73 0.03 4.18 19.77
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Table 3.5. Summary Statistics of Factor Exposure
This table reports the statistics of the factor exposure, estimated using both gross
returns (GR) and net returns (NR) of individual hedge funds in the TASS database
that has at least 24 months of continuous, non-backfilled history from January 1994
to April 2010. The two factor models investigated include the Fung and Hsieh (2004)
seven-factor model (FH) and a factor model that selects the risk factors based on
stepwise regression. Panel A reports the average factor exposure of the Fung and
Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model, using returns of both individual funds and strategy
indices. Panel B reports the results of the the factor model based on stepwise re-
gression, where Panel B1 reports the regression statistics and Panel B2 reports the
percentage of funds with factor exposures and the average factor exposures. See Table
A.1 for a description of factors used in the models.
Panel A: Average Factor Exposure of Fung and Hsieh (2004) Seven-factor Model
Factor Individual Funds Equally-weighted index Value-weighted index
MKTRF
GR 0.3308 *** 0.3199 *** 0.3056 ***
NR 0.3068 *** 0.2941 *** 0.2812 ***
diff 0.0239 *** 0.0258 0.0244
SMB
GR 0.0093 0.1464 *** 0.1490 *
NR -0.0003 0.1255 *** 0.1334 *
diff 0.0096 *** 0.0209 0.0157
D10YR
GR -0.0052 *** -0.0021 -0.0125
NR -0.0053 *** -0.0028 -0.0121 *
diff 0.0001 0.0007 -0.0004
DSPRD
GR -0.0243 *** -0.0228 *** -0.0223 ***
NR -0.0235 *** -0.0236 *** -0.0221 ***
diff -0.0008 *** 0.0008 -0.0002
PTFSBD
GR -0.0025 -0.0024 -0.0080
NR -0.0023 -0.0032 -0.0080
diff -0.0003 * 0.0008 0.0001
PTFSFX
GR 0.0093 *** 0.0130 * 0.0282 **
NR 0.0085 *** 0.0113 * 0.0245 **
diff 0.0008 *** 0.0017 0.0037
PTFSCOM
GR 0.0038 *** 0.0053 0.0032
NR 0.0021 0.0037 0.0025
diff 0.0018 *** 0.0016 0.0007
Panel B1: Statistics of Factor Model based on Stepwise Regression
Individual Funds Equally-weighted index Value-weighted index
GR NR GR NR GR NR
No. of funds 2956 2956 2816 2816 2956 2956
Adjusted-R2 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.64 0.29 0.31
No. of factors 14 14 11 11 8 9
111
Panel B2: Factor model based on stepwise regression
Factor
Funds w. Factor Exposure (%) Average Factor Exposure
Gross Return Net Return Gross Return Net Return
MKTRF 73.1% 73.5% 0.4622 0.3939
SMB 47.4% 47.4% 0.1090 0.0392
HML 47.3% 47.3% -0.1210 -0.0844
SMBSQ 37.8% 37.8% -3.3254 -1.7638
HMLSQ 36.9% 37.9% -1.7570 -2.0944
D10YR 43.2% 43.8% -0.0138 -0.0128
DSPRD 47.2% 49.2% -0.0397 -0.0429
PTFSBD 38.0% 38.4% 0.0216 0.0138
PTFSFX 35.8% 35.7% 0.0142 0.0073
PTFSCOM 36.8% 37.0% 0.0476 0.0384
PTFSIR 49.8% 49.0% -0.0246 -0.0253
PTFSSTK 44.5% 44.1% 0.0657 0.0497
lag mktrf 40.3% 40.1% 0.1508 0.1100
lag SMB 35.6% 35.7% -0.0226 -0.0232
lag HML 34.9% 35.4% 0.1084 0.1274
lag SMBSQ 35.4% 35.2% -1.3630 -1.7415
lag HMLSQ 39.1% 39.3% -2.7175 -2.4134
lag D10YR 35.2% 34.8% -0.0077 -0.0043
lag DSPRD 37.2% 37.8% -0.0082 -0.0019
lag PTFSBD 33.9% 33.8% -0.0276 -0.0145
lag PTFSFX 35.4% 35.0% 0.0116 0.0066
lag PTFSCOM 33.4% 33.5% 0.0240 0.0100
lag PTFSIR 36.4% 36.9% 0.0033 0.0052
lag PTFSSTK 35.5% 35.5% 0.0179 0.0184
lag2 mktrf 39.6% 39.6% 0.1367 0.1168
lag2 SMB 35.7% 36.0% -0.0352 -0.0211
lag2 HML 38.2% 39.6% -0.1660 -0.1352
lag2 SMBSQ 35.1% 35.0% -0.4939 -2.1102
lag2 HMLSQ 38.9% 38.5% -0.6075 -0.8493
lag2 D10YR 34.3% 34.6% 0.0100 0.0084
lag2 DSPRD 36.3% 36.2% -0.0131 -0.0099
lag2 PTFSBD 37.6% 37.4% 0.0248 0.0113
lag2 PTFSFX 35.9% 35.4% 0.0020 0.0054
lag2 PTFSCOM 35.3% 35.8% 0.0010 -0.0082
lag2 PTFSIR 35.9% 36.1% -0.0128 -0.0131
lag2 PTFSSTK 36.8% 35.6% -0.0264 -0.0238
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Table 3.7. Average Alphas of Equally-Weighted Hedge Fund Strategy Indices
This table reports alpha estimated with two alternative factor models, and two dif-
ferent estimation methodologies for 10 different hedge fund strategies and the whole
sample. The two factor models investigated include the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-
factor model (FH) and a factor model that selects the risk factors based on stepwise
regression. The factor models are estimated based on a constant-loading OLS ap-
proach, and an OLS estimation over rolling 24-month windows. The table is based
on both gross returns and net returns of equally-weighted indices of funds with at lest
24 continuous non-backfilled observations in the TASS database from January 1994
and April 2010. N indicates the number of funds in each sample. For rolling OLS the
first 23 observations of each fund are lost for estimating the first alpha. All alphas
are expressed in monthly percentage returns, with *, ** and *** denoting significance
levels of 10%, 5% and 1% (two-sided) based on Newey-West standard errors. The
differences between GR and NR statistics (diff) are reported.
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Table 7: Average Alphas of Equally-Weighted Hedge Fund Strategy Indices (Cont’d)
Category
Fung and Hsieh (2004) Stepwise Regression
αOLS Adj R2 αroll αOLS Adj R2 αroll
Convertible Arbitrage
GR 0.66 *** 0.61 0.59 *** 0.74 *** 0.61 0.54 ***
NR 0.37 *** 0.63 0.32 *** 0.44 *** 0.63 0.29 ***
diff 0.29 0.27 0.30 0.25
Dedicated Short Bias
GR 0.78 *** 0.63 0.83 *** 0.94 *** 0.61 0.88 ***
NR 0.40 *** 0.62 0.49 *** 0.57 *** 0.60 0.58 ***
diff 0.38 0.34 0.37 0.30
Emerging Markets
GR 0.57 *** 0.50 0.57 *** 0.70 ** 0.45 0.77 ***
NR 0.19 ** 0.51 0.22 0.24 0.46 0.45 ***
diff 0.38 0.35 0.46 0.32
Equity Market Neutral
GR 0.62 *** 0.10 0.63 *** 0.72 *** 0.10 0.75 ***
NR 0.31 *** 0.13 0.32 *** 0.39 *** 0.11 0.44 ***
diff 0.31 0.30 0.33 0.31
Event Driven
GR 0.68 *** 0.44 0.62 *** 0.76 *** 0.44 0.62 ***
NR 0.37 *** 0.48 0.34 *** 0.45 *** 0.48 0.35 ***
diff 0.30 0.28 0.31 0.27
Fixed Income Arbitrage
GR 0.54 *** 0.46 0.57 *** 0.51 *** 0.54 0.49 ***
NR 0.23 *** 0.48 0.27 *** 0.21 0.57 0.20 ***
diff 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.29
Global Macro
GR 1.03 *** 0.26 0.73 *** 0.89 *** 0.17 0.54 ***
NR 0.64 *** 0.26 0.39 *** 0.51 ** 0.18 0.22 **
diff 0.39 0.34 0.38 0.33
Long/Short Equity Hedge
GR 0.79 *** 0.75 0.82 *** 0.81 *** 0.79 0.80 ***
NR 0.45 *** 0.78 0.48 *** 0.47 *** 0.81 0.45 ***
diff 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.35
Multi-Strategy
GR 0.69 *** 0.33 0.63 *** 0.60 *** 0.31 0.64 ***
NR 0.38 *** 0.33 0.32 *** 0.35 ** 0.29 0.39 ***
diff 0.31 0.31 0.24 0.25
Options Strategy
GR 0.64 *** 0.01 0.81 *** 0.48 -0.19 0.67 ***
NR 0.32 ** 0.01 0.47 *** 0.24 -0.15 0.70 ***
diff 0.32 0.34 0.24 -0.02
All
GR 0.76 *** 0.61 0.68 *** 0.86 *** 0.62 0.97 ***
NR 0.42 *** 0.64 0.36 *** 0.48 *** 0.65 0.49 ***
diff 0.34 0.32 0.38 0.48
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Table 3.8. Alphas for Subgroups of AUM, Fund Flows and Deltas
This table reports the aveerage alphas for subgroups of hedge funds sorted by AUM,
fund flows (scaled by AUM), and total delta, respectively. The two factor models
investigated include the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model (FH) and a factor
model that selects the risk factors based on stepwise regression (Stepwise). The factor
models are estimated based on a constant-loading OLS approach. The table is based
on both gross returns (GR) and net returns (NR) of funds with at lest 24 continuous
non-backfilled observations in the TASS database from January 1994 and April 2010.
N indicates the number of funds in each sample. All alphas are expressed in monthly
percentage returns. The asterisks *, **, and *** denoting significance levels (two-
sided) at 10%, 5% and 1% for the difference between the top and bottom quintile
groups.
Panel A: Alphas for Subgroups of AUM
Quintiles of AUM N
FH Model Stepwise Model
GR NR GR NR
Highest AUM 591 0.8508 0.5200 1.1367 0.8297
2 591 0.7189 0.4182 0.8802 0.5989
3 592 0.6206 0.3170 0.9427 0.5913
4 591 0.6401 0.3327 0.7756 0.4754
Lowest AUM 591 0.4787 0.1800 0.8125 0.3167
Highest - Lowest 0.3722 *** 0.3400 *** 0.3242 0.5130
Panel B: Alphas for Subgroups of Flow (%)
Quintiles of Flow (%) N
FH Model Stepwise Model
GR NR GR NR
Highest Flow (%) 591 0.9769 0.6168 1.0674 0.8444
2 591 0.7553 0.4342 1.0132 0.7806
3 592 0.6540 0.3548 0.7787 0.4077
4 591 0.5447 0.2571 0.8680 0.2193
Lowest Flow (%) 591 0.3782 0.1048 0.8208 0.5602
Highest - Lowest 0.5987 *** 0.5120 *** 0.2466 0.2842
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Table 8: Alphas for Subgroups of AUM, Fund Flows and Deltas (Cont’d)
Panel A: Alphas for Subgroups of AUM
Quintiles of AUM N
FH Model Stepwise Model
GR NR GR NR
Highest AUM 591 0.8508 0.5200 1.1367 0.8297
2 591 0.7189 0.4182 0.8802 0.5989
3 592 0.6206 0.3170 0.9427 0.5913
4 591 0.6401 0.3327 0.7756 0.4754
Lowest AUM 591 0.4787 0.1800 0.8125 0.3167
Highest - Lowest 0.3722 *** 0.3400 *** 0.3242 0.5130
Panel B: Alphas for Subgroups of Flow (%)
Quintiles of Flow (%) N
FH Model Stepwise Model
GR NR GR NR
Highest Flow (%) 591 0.9769 0.6168 1.0674 0.8444
2 591 0.7553 0.4342 1.0132 0.7806
3 592 0.6540 0.3548 0.7787 0.4077
4 591 0.5447 0.2571 0.8680 0.2193
Lowest Flow (%) 591 0.3782 0.1048 0.8208 0.5602
Highest - Lowest 0.5987 *** 0.5120 *** 0.2466 0.2842
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Figure 3.1. Average Alpha Over Time
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APPENDIX
ALGORITHM FOR THE COMPUTATION OF DELTA,
FEES, GROSS RETURNS AND FUND FLOWS
In this algorithm, we extend the algorithm of computation of delta as in Appendix
A of Agarwal et al. (2009b) to allow accrual of incentive fees, monthly estimation, and
inclusion of management fees. We calculate the monthly gross returns, gross asset
values and fees of hedge fund, and the delta of manager’s option, using net returns,
net asset values and other hedge fund characteristic variables. It takes into account
the high-water mark and hurdle rate provisions, as well as the monthly net flows of
asset value.
As stated by Agarwal et al. (2009b), incentive fee contracts provide managers
with options on investors’ assets under management (AUM). Following Agarwal
et al. (2009b), we define manager’s option delta as the sensitivity of option value to
a one percent change in asset value.
Manager′sOptionDelta = N(Z)× S × 0.01× IF% (A.1)
Z = ln(S/X)+T (r+σ
2/2)
σ
√
T
,
S = spot price (market value of the investors assets as of end of current year)
X = exercise price (the market value of the investors assets that must be reached the
subsequent year before incentive fees can be paid that year)
T = time to maturity of the option (1 year)
r = ln(1+ risk-free interest rate) (i.e., ln(1 + LIBOR rate for the subsequent year))
σ = volatility of monthly net returns (estimated over the year)
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I = incentive fee rate (expressed as a fraction)
N( ) = cumulative distribution function (cdf) of standard normal distribution.
The managers option delta of the fund is the sum of the deltas from different
sets of investors, each of whom has their own exercise price depending on when that
individual entered the fund. To compute the spot price (S) and exercise price (X)
used in the computation of delta above, we make the following assumptions:
The following assumptions are made to compute the gross return and fees.
1. Assets at inception are assumed to be that of the investor.
2. Investors’ money flows occur at the end of each month.
3. When there is a net inflow, all the new flows come from a new investor. When
there is a net outflow, we adopt first-in-first-out rule to decide which investor’s
money leaves the fund, and the accrued incentive fee for the outflow is paid to
the manager.
4. Each investor has an individual exercise price depending on the timing of en-
tering the fund, the hurdle rate and high-water mark provisions.
5. The high-water mark is the highest historical year-end NAV , or the initial per
share price, whichever is higher. It is investor specific and reset at the end of
each year. If there is also a hurdle rate provision, the high-water mark will grow
at the hurdle rate each month.
6. Hurdle rate is the monthlirized three-month LIBOR (the London interbank
offered rate) of US dollars for funds with a hurdle rate provision.
7. If no incentive fee is paid for a month due to insufficient returns, the hurdle for
the next month is based on a geometrically compounded hurdle rate over that
month.
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8. Management fees are paid monthly.1 Incentive fees are paid annually and ac-
crued before the end of each year. The accrued incentive fees are reinvested
in the fund before being paid to the managers, and the earnings from these
investments belong to investors.
9. The manager reinvests all the previously-collected incentive fees into the fund
after paying personal taxes. Offshore managers pay no personal taxes on incen-
tive fees, whereas onshore managers pay a tax rate of 35%.
We adopt the following steps to calculate fees, gross returns, manager’s investment
and Delta.
1. The first investor enters the fund at the end of month 0, the second investor
enters the fund at the end of month 1 if the net flow in the second month is
positive, and so on.
2. The Gross Asset Value (GAVt) per share of investor’s investment is given by
GAVt =
[NAVt−1 ·NSharest−1 + AIFt−1 ·min(NSharest−2, NSharest−1)]
NSharest−1
×(1 +GrossReturnt) (A.2)
3. Management fee of each investor is the a percentage (MF%i) of his net invest-
ment. The management fee per share is given by
MFi,t = NAVt−1 ×MF%i (A.3)
1Agarwal et al. (2009b) assumed that monthly fees cover fixed costs. However, without imposing
this assumption, we find that the management fee takes a significant portion of the total fees of
hedge fund, thus may not be totally canceled out by fixed cost.
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4. Calculate the accrued incentive fees of each investor. If there is a high-water
mark provision, the accrued incentive fee of investor i in month t is given by
AIFi,t = max {0, (GAVt −MFt −HWMi,t)× IF%} (A.4)
The accrued incentive fee of the fund is a weighted average of the accrued
incentive fees of all current investors, with the weight equal to the number of
shares each investor holds.
If the fund has no high-water mark provision, then the incentive fee calculation
of the investors is memoryless, and the per share monthly incentive fee and
accrued incentive fee are given by
IFi,t = max {0, [GAVt −MFt − (NAVt−1 + AIFt−1)× (1 + hurdlei ·Ht)]}
×IF% (A.5)
AIFi,t = AIFi,t−1 + IFi,t (A.6)
5. At the end of each year, all shares with high-water mark lower than the year-
end NAV will collapse into one series of shares with the high-water mark reset
to the year-end NAV. Otherwise, the high-water mark of the investor remains
unchanged.
6. Solve for the gross return numerically. The Gross Asset Value (GAVt) is given
by the following equation.
GAVt = NAVt +MFt + AIFt (A.7)
Substituting equation (A.2), (A.3) and (A.4) in equation (A.7), we can numer-
ically solve for the gross return (GrossReturnt).
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7. Compute the net market value of investment of all investors, the number of
shares, and fund flow of the month.
MV invt = AUMt − AIFt ·NSharest−1 −MVmgrt−1
×(1 +GrossReturnt) (A.8)
NSharest = MV invt /NAVt (A.9)
Flowt = NAVt (NSharest −NSharest−1) (A.10)
8. Compute the market value of manager’s investment. The market value of man-
ager’s investment in the fund, MVmgrt, the sum of the month-end value of the
manager’s month beginning investment and the post-tax incentive fees earned
in that month.
MVmgrt = MVmgrt−1(1 +GrossReturnt)
+
∑
i
AIFi,t ·∆NSharesi,t · 1∆NSharesi,t<0 · 1month 6=12
+ AIFt ·NSharest−1 · 1month=12 (A.11)
9. Calculate the exercise price X for each investor at the end of each year. The
exercise price Xi is higher than the year-end high-water mark of investor i (if
the fund has a high-water mark provision) or year-end NAV (if the fund lacks a
high-water mark provision) by the hurdle rate (LIBOR if the fund has a hurdle
rate provision, or 0 if the fund lacks a hurdle rate provision).
10. Using the S and X of various investors capital, compute the delta of each and
sum them up along with the delta from the managers investment to estimate
the total delta of the fund.
11. The total delta of the fund is the sum of delta from investors’ assets (manager’s
option delta) and the delta from the manager’s stake. Since all the return from
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the manager’s investment is retained, the delta from the manager’s stake equals
market value of manager’s investment in the fund multiplied by 0.01 (i.e., when
the fund earns one-percent return, the value of the manager’s stake goes up by
one percent). Managerial ownership, as we use in our analysis, is the market
value of the manager’s investment in the fund expressed as a fraction of the
fund’s total assets under management.
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Table A.1. Definition of Factors
Factor Description
MKTRF Excess return of the CRSP value-weighted index
SMB Fama-French size factor
HML Fama-French value factor
SMBSQ Fama-French size factor squared
HMLSQ Fama-French value factor squared
D10YR Change in the 10-year treasury yield
DSPRD Change in the spread between BAA yield and 10-year treasury yield
PTFSBD Primitive trend follower strategy bond
PTFSFX Primitive trend follower strategy currency
PTFSCOM Primitive trend follower strategy commodity
PTFSIR Primitive trend follower strategy interest rate
PTFSSTK Primitive trend follower strategy stock
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